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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLUTION OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

©

BY

DEBORAH M. A. STRONG

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Edmonton, Alberta

SPRING, 1993

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Baha Abu Laban
B. Abu-Laban

T. Keating

Date: April 19, 1993

DEDICATION

To my parents, Bernard and Mary Ashmore, who stood by me and gave me their love, encouragement and support and to my son, Geoffrey I hope that the world you grow up into will be a safe and peaceful place.

ABSTRACT

In protracted social conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian it is important to understand the nature of the conflict and how to resolve it by addressing the underlying causes of grievance and focusing on the needs, values and motivations of the parties concerned. The advocacy of a conciliated framework that is non-imposed based on human needs of identity, security, human dignity and well-being and participation in the processes that determine these, can be of central importance to conflict resolution.

On the one hand, settlement processes as evidenced in the peace plans discussed led to temporary solutions or no solutions at all and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict failed to address the human needs of the parties to the conflict. On the other hand, a framework that is conciliated underlines the importance of exploration of the needs of the opposing party in order to arrive at satisfactory solutions to conflict.

A genuine peace for Israelis and Palestinians means an outcome from negotiations that meets the basic felt needs of both parties and leaves them better off and more secure than they are today and meets their minimal requirements for justice. The two peoples must find through negotiated solutions ways of coexisting harmoniously. Therefore a multitrack approach is important combined with opportunities for informal interaction at the local level. Confidence building measures must be encouraged so that Israelis and Palestinians will learn to trust one another.

Resolution for the Palestinians will require real achievement of Palestinian self-determination which means a sovereign, independent state. A settlement that would deny actualization of this goal of sovereignty for the Palestinian people will not stand and would be repudiated. Therefore, at a certain point it must be recognized by creative leaders that you must accommodate the enemy for there is no other way.

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INTRODUCTION

The study of conflict resolution[1] is in its infancy. Although considerable work has been done on the causes of war, it is evident that substantially less has been done on the resolution of conflict. It must not remain so if the costs inflicted on the victims of conflict are to be lessened. Therefore, we study world politics and address issues of conflict resolution because they will determine the fate of the earth.[2]

Neither scholars nor practitioners are able to offer well-grounded advice on how to prevent or terminate conflict, much less on how to resolve hostile relations such that war is no longer an acceptable part of the policy agenda.[3] The challenge becomes one of managing hostile relationships and critical variables in an effort to limit damage. This paper attempts to go beyond this to establish a framework for conflict resolution by going to the root causes of conflict and addressing resolution by establishing the basic source of protracted conflict.[4] The task of conflict analysis is to look at the origin and development of conflict and relate this to termination[5] or resolution.

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[1] John W. Burton, A.J.R. Groom, C.R. Mitchell, A.V.S. De Reuck, THE STUDY OF WORLD SOCIETY: A LONDON PERSPECTIVE (Pittsburgh P.A. International Studies Association 1974), p. 69.
John W. Burton, GLOBAL CONFLICT: THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Inc., 1984), p. 143.
Conflict resolution is for the purposes of this paper a situation in which there is no longer a substantive conflict, where there is an outcome that fully meet the needs and interests of all parties; and this contrasts with conflict settlement which means a situation where parties are restrained from continuing a dispute by a threat system.

[2] William T. Fox, "World Politics As Conflict Resolution," INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, Edited by Robert O. Matthews, Arthur G. Rubinoff & Janice G. Stein (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1984), p. 7.
World politics is the study of which nation-states get what, when and how. For the purposes of this paper the identity group rather than the nation-state is considered to be the primary unit of analysis.

[3] Ross Rudolph & David Dewitt, "Managing The Arab-Israeli Conflict," MIDDLE EAST FOCUS, 9 (Summer/Fall 1986), p. 3.

Part of the difficulty with the development of approaches has been the limitation of some traditional thinking and perspectives on conflict and its resolution.[6] Approaches to "settlement" of conflict where agreements are reached at an interstate level may not address those levels most affected by the conflict. "Settlements" to resolve protracted social conflicts arrived at by governments at other levels and imposed at the local level may not address the level where conflict is most persistent and disruptive, which may be the local level.[7] Moreover, there is direct correlation between the assumptions we make about conflict and the solutions advocated for "settling" or "resolving" it. Therefore, the search for broader explanations motivates the analyst to elaborate alternate paradigms[8] or frameworks.

---

[4] Edward E. Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions," INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Edited by Edward Azar & John Burton (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Inc., 1986), pp. 28-29.
Protracted conflict refers to an on-going, seemingly unresolvable conflict that has certain enduring features such as extreme disparities in levels of political privilege and opportunity, economic and technological underdevelopment, and unintegrated political and social systems.

[5] A.V. De Reuck, "The Logic of Conflict: Its Origin, Development and Resolution," CONFLICT IN WORLD SOCIETY, p. 98.

[6] John Burton, "The History of International Conflict Resolution" INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, p. 52.

[7] John Burton, CONFLICT AND COMMUNICATION (London: MacMillan & Co., 1969) p. 20.

[8] John A. Vasquez, THE POWER OF POWER POLITICS: A CRITIQUE (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1983), p. 5.

The development of a conciliated framework[9] based on human needs is of central importance to resolution of conflict because it addresses the underlying issues related to conflict and offers a framework for change and a viable outcome to conflict.

Aspects of ethnicity, social conflict theory, self-determination, social theory of inequality, and normative theory are included in a tentative theoretical framework of analysis. An analysis of the background of the Arab-Israeli conflict is given and the human needs approach is applied to a discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In the establishment of the resolution process, five stages are elaborated which can be conditions for successful resolution. Three peace plans are outlined and discussed and evaluated in terms of their merits and deficiencies in relation to actualization of the needs and aspirations of the parties. Finally the current peace talks that started in Madrid and that are ongoing are discussed and principles are established of a conciliated framework for conflict resolution.

"Paradigm" has been defined as a set of fundamental assumptions scholars make about the world they are studying.

[9] A "conciliated" framework is one that is not imposed on the parties to a conflict and means they are not restrained from continuing a dispute by a threat system based on power and enforcement of power norms, but rather one that is based on human needs and solutions arrived at by the parties themselves. Non-directive third parties may be in the background to help create the atmosphere in which negotiation can take place.

BACKGROUND: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

It is hypothesized that efforts made to moderate, manage and ultimately resolve conflict must be informed by a prior understanding of the nature of the conflict, the parties, and the issues involved.[1]

The Arab-Israeli conflict is multifaceted involving a range of issues. The historical and psychological roots of the conflict are traced to the relationship between Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab peoples, both of whom have sought political expression of their national identity which has centered on the same territory--the land between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea which constituted the British Mandatory Territory of Palestine between 1922 and 1948.[2] Thus, the Arab-Israeli dispute has revolved around a case of dual recognition of group identities and rival territorial ethnic claims.[3]

One can conceptualize the Arab-Israeli conflict happening on four levels: first, a conflict between communities (Inter-communal) over land and other defined issues between Jews and Palestinians; second, after the inception of the state of Israel, an international conflict between the state of Israel and the four neighboring Arab states over competitive state interests; third, the ideological conflict between Zionism as the National Liberation Movement of the Jewish people and Arab nationalism; fourth, the clash of civilizations between various elements in the Islamic world view and the idea of a Jewish state in the part of the world which the Muslims consider their own.[4] It is evident from the complexity of the conflict that with more issues and more participants involved, there is a much greater difficulty in resolving it.

---

[1] Gabriel Ben-Dor, "The Arab-Israel Conflict: Patterns and Dynamics," MIDDLE EAST FOCUS, 9 (Summer/Fall, 1986), pp. 6-9.

[2] Herbert C. Kelman, "Overcoming the Barriers to Negotiation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," THE JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES, 16(Autumn, 1986), p. 13.

[3] Anthony D. Smith, "Conflict and Collective Identity: Class, Ethnic and Nation," INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, p. 75.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has gone through various phases. It began as a conflict between two communities under the jurisdiction of the British Mandate; with the formation of the Jewish state in 1948 the conflict between Jews and Arab Palestinians was transformed into an interstate conflict between Israel and the Arab states. Moreover, the identity and role of the Arabs of Palestine ("Palestinians") came under the larger Arab nation.[5] Since 1967 the important change has been the renewed assertiveness and re-emergence of the Arab Palestinians as a community which again restructured the dispute along communal lines. Moreover, the reappearance of inter-communal conflict did not end the inter-state conflict.[6] The Palestinian dimension of the conflict is now widely recognized as the central core. Stated in geopolitical terms the Palestinian problem involves who shall rule, Jew or Arab over the territory defined after

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[4] Ben-Dor, pp. 6-7.

[5] Mark A. Heller, "The Palestinian Dimension of the Arab-Israeli Conflict," MIDDLE EAST FOCUS, 9(Summer/Fall 1986), p. 23.

[6] Shmuel Sandler, "The Great Powers And Conflict Transformation In The Arab-Israeli Dispute," SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Paul Marantz and Blema S. Steinberg (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 269-270.

World War I as the "British Mandate for Palestine," which since 1967 has been under Israeli control except for the East Bank which Jordan continues to control. The question has become whether or not there should be another Arab sovereignty, i.e., a Palestinian sovereignty over the areas occupied since 1967.[7] Since the competing territorial claims of Israeli and Palestinians represent the origin and core issue of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict, there can be no peace in the positive sense of the term, without a resolution of the Palestinian problem and that does not address the basic needs and concerns of both sides.

In summary, the Arab-Israeli conflict has evolved from an inter-communal type (Mandatory Palestine) to an inter-state conflict type (1948 to 1967) to a compound conflict type from 1967 to the present which has involved both inter-state and inter-communal components.[8]

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[7] Harvey Sicherman, PALESTINIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT (AUTONOMY) ITS PAST AND FUTURE. (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), p. 70.

[8] Sandler, pp. 269-270.

TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

'Protracted' social conflicts may seem apparently unresolvable because of enduring characteristics such as extreme disparities in political, social and economic privileges and opportunities and distributive injustice. It is hypothesized that solutions that do not deal with these features must rest on law enforcement, the use of threat or power control by the more powerful party to the conflict.[1] Moreover, conflict is likely to erupt again because the underlying grievances of the parties have not been part of the solution.

It is assumed that conflicts will only be sharpened by the mentality in which power is seen as a principal means of benefiting 'us' while 'they' become a dehumanized group. It is hypothesized that conflicts are not objective, because of scarcity, but rather subjective, because of hierarchies of values that vary with changed perceptions and relationships and are capable of being influenced by knowledge and communication.[2] Moreover, if we view conflict as a decision process which selects between alternative futures, then violence may be replaced by other decision processes which are less costly, more persuasive and less power-laden.[3] The outcome of the decision process is for each side to choose their own future. As well, it is argued that a conflict will only be resolved if the parties each, equally and mutually arrive at their own solutions. A resolution of the conflict means an outcome that meets the basic felt needs of each party that are part of value systems; and are also responsive to the basic fears of the parties concerned.[4]

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[1] Azar, pp. 28-29.

[2] Burton et al, THE STUDY OF WORLD SOCIETY: A LONDON PERSPECTIVE, p. 72.

[3] Anthony De Reuck, "The Logic of Conflict: Its Origin, Development And Resolution", CONFLICT IN WORLD SOCIETY, p. 99.

If conflict is the sum total of a series of disputes then it is likely that failure to separate out issues and parties may give the conflict an appearance of complexity that requires some external coercive settlement. Moreover, a failure to resolve conflict at a local level may lead to influences from other levels. It is hypothesized that the transactions that occur at the local level with parties may be the most intimate, persistent and disruptive and it is these that create conflict and restoration of these that resolves it.[5] The focus is on the nature of the conflict and how to resolve it by addressing the fundamental causes of grievance and by understanding the needs, values and motivations of the parties concerned[6] and the level at which it occurs. Contemporary approaches to conflict resolution based on power and enforcement of power norms may be a reason why conflicts are protracted because they are holding strategies[7]and they offer only temporary solutions without dealing with the underlying issues of conflict. It is hypothesized that it is not by rigid preservation of the status quo that the future may best be preserved but by vigorous and intelligent attempts to resolve the causes of conflict at their roots.[8] Thus, it is posited, that what is needed is a commitment to human needs and values for resolving conflicts and development of a normative kind of world politics that focuses on basic needs and values that extend across cultural boundaries and are universal and encompass justice[9], human rights and progress.

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[4] Kelman, p. 13.

[5] Burton, CONFLICT AND COMMUNICATION.

[6] John Burton, "The History of International Conflict Resolution", p. 46.

[7] Burton, GLOBAL CONFLICT: THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS, p. 94.

Therefore, what is proposed is a framework for resolution of conflict that goes beyond a system of threat and coercive measures to reach towards peace based upon justice. A settlement based upon escalating power politics maximizes the destructive potential of conflict[10], and does not address the satisfaction of human needs. This approach is more promising because it calls for humanization of the problem and those in conflict.

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[8] Gordon A. Craig & Alexander L. George FORCE AND STATECRAFT: DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 187.

[9] Hedley Bull, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 79. "Justice" means the removal of privilege or discrimination, for equality in distribution and application of rights as between the strong and weak, the rich and poor, the black and white, the large and small etc.

[10] Margot Light, "The Problem-Solving Workshops: The Role of Scholarship In Conflict Resolution", CONFLICT IN WORLD SOCIETY, p. 151. When solutions are imposed on conflicting parties by coercion or other kinds of pressure the amount of effective participation by the parties is felt to be minimal.

SETTLEMENT VERSUS RESOLUTION

There is an important distinction between "settlement" and "resolution" in the process of conflict resolution. At best a settlement reduces the level or intensity of conflict but it leaves the conflict situation unchanged; whereas resolution removes the very ground of dispute by addressing the needs of the protagonists and thereby transforms the conflict situation. Resolution also involves an integration of the parties' needs and objectives so that a solution has been found in which neither side has had to sacrifice anything.

Settlements are usually imposed by a third party such as a greater power or an international court. The outcome of a settlement is a win-lose scenario or some compromise in which some or all parties are to some degree losers and probably feel somewhat aggrieved; and some degree of coercion is probably necessary to enforce the settlement.[1] Because of this, the result of a settlement may be that the conflict will come up again and again in some other form, for in compromise one side gives up its desire, but because they are not content to rest there they will try at a further point to get the whole of their desire. We only have to look to industrial controversy and international controversy to see how often this occurs.[2]

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[1] Burton, "The Procedures of Conflict Resolution," p. 94.

[2] C. R. Mitchell, PEACEMAKING AND THE CONSULTANT'S ROLE (Westmead Engl: Gower Publ. Co. Ltd., 1981), p. 9.

An integral part of a conciliated framework for conflict resolution would endeavor to change the relationship of the conflicting parties aiming at resolution rather than settlement that would be self-sustaining without coercion. Because a problem in relationships remains even after there is a final settlement, it is not until an option is found that satisfies the needs and interests of all parties that the problem is solved.[3]

Winning is the aim of most parties involved in conflicts, whether they are industrial, race or in international relations. When "to win" is the goal in itself it can lead to the loss of longer term relationships by trying to win the conflict. The dilemma could be avoided if it were possible to arrive at win solutions or agreements that would give all the parties what they were really seeking. This outcome would be possible if the solutions offered addressed the felt needs and concerns of each side.

It is important to identify the needs and the issues underlying the declared issues. Thus, it is important to distinguish between tactics and goals, for example, the claim for territory may be a tactic in the pursuit of the goal of security. International conflict may be stated in terms of territory, but underlying the overt grievances are often issues related to identity and security and settlement processes do not uncover these hidden needs and concerns.[4]

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[3] Burton, "The Procedures of Conflict Resolution," p. 95.

[4] Burton, GLOBAL CONFLICT: THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS, p. 147.

Creative approaches to conflict resolution as opposed to settlement should try to go beyond the simple compromise of demands and try to satisfy the needs behind the demands. There is a distinction between concentrating on the demands and solving the basic problem. The example of how two women in a library disagreed over whether to open or close a window is illustrative of an apparently incompatible pair of goals or ones that could be dealt with by opening the window halfway, which would satisfy neither woman. The women found that by identifying their needs they could find a mutually satisfactory solution, because what one really wanted was to decrease the draft by closing the window, and the other wanted to increase the fresh air by opening it. When they were able to identify their needs they then found a mutually satisfactory solution of opening the window in the next room.[5]

Therefore, it is hypothesized that a conciliated framework for conflict resolution must follow an analytical identification of needs and need satisfaction mechanisms in order to be effective.

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[5] R. W. Fogg, "Dealing With Conflict: A Repertoire of Creative, Peaceful Approaches," JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 29(June, 1985), p. 332.

HUMAN NEEDS ENCOMPASSED IN A CONCILIATED FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

If a human needs approach is adopted there are implications that those in conflict have in common basic needs that must be satisfied if a positive outcome is to be achieved for each group in conflict. The conflict is then perceived as a problem: how to satisfy the legitimate human and commonly held needs of the groups or parties concerned.[1]

Such commonly held or universal needs such as distinctive identity, recognition of identity, security, human dignity and well-being; and free and effective participation in the processes that determine conditions of identity and security are basic needs that are part of the human development process.[2] Although there is no consensus as to what these needs are, other writers have recognized the existence of universal needs.

Paul Sites outlined eight needs of human beings which include: a need for response from others, for security, for recognition, which means approval, a need for stimulation from outside, for meaning, a need to control and to be seen as rational and for distributive justice.[3] The inference was that individuals engage in deviant behavior or are unhappy when needs are not in some way gratified and are happy when the needs are gratified.

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[1] John Burton, DEVIANCE, TERRORISM AND WAR (Oxford: Martin Robertson & Co., 1979), p. 173.

[2] Burton, "The Procedures of Conflict Resolution", pp. 99 & 111. There is no real consensus on what these needs are but for the purposes of this paper I have taken what I think to be the ones that would seem to be most important. Other writers have included a need for response, a need for security, for distributive justice, a need for meaning, a need to be seen as rational and a need to control. I added "human dignity and well-being", which according to the United Nations' Human Development report of 1990 includes: efforts to improve peoples chances of leading long, healthy lives, providing access to education and making possible a decent standard of living. Melvyn Westlake, "Measuring Human Well-Being from South of London, WORLD PRESS REVIEW 37 (September, 1990), p. 67.

Donald Peretz argued that there are some wants that are constant across systems and explanation of deviant behavior is found in denial of human needs.[4] Barrington Moore when trying to define the notion of justice, observed that it is obvious that human beings have something called innate needs which include: needs for authority, social coordination, material security, division of labor, and distributive justice.[5]

Ted Gurr advanced theories of rebellion and war that outline some universal findings of behavior at all social levels, and his basic frustration-aggression proposition was that the greater the intensity of deprivation, the greater the magnitude of violence.[6] He outlined a three-fold categorization of "needs", "goals" or "values" including: welfare values which are those that contribute to physical well-being, power values or those that determine the extent to which men can influence the actions of others and self-actualization values or personal growth needs.[7]

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[3] Paul Sites, CONTROL: THE BASIS OF SOCIAL ORDER (New York: Dunellen Publishing, 1973), pp. 9, 36-37, 39 and 43.

[4] Burton, GLOBAL CONFLICT: THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS, p. 139.

[5] Barrington Moore, INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASES OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT (New York: Prentice Hall, 1978), pp. 15-46.

[6] Ted R. Gurr, WHY MEN REBEL (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 7.

Other writers such as Talcott Parsons listed needs including: a need for approval, response, acceptance and self esteem.[8] As well Abraham Maslow postulated a hierarchy among needs which included in ascending order: satisfaction of physical needs, safety, order, a need for a love, and self actualization.[9]

Therefore, it is hypothesized that it is in the interests of each party to a conflict to explore the needs and values of opposing parties so that ways and means may be developed to satisfy them. What is important is that each side see the other's basic needs as part of its own problem.[10] It is assumed that the needs of both sides are the same.[11] The focus then is on cooperation and agreement based on shared needs and values, which are common to all and whose pursuit is important to all people. If Hans Morgenthau's theory of power politics was deduced from the assertion of a basic need to dominate[12], then this paper focuses on a different set of basic needs that are more richly explanatory and predictive.

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[7] Ibid., p. 25.

[8] Sites, p. 6.

[9] A.H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation", PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW L(1943), pp. 370-396.

[10] Harold H. Saunders, "Arabs And Israelis: A Political Strategy", FOREIGN AFFAIRS 64(Winter 1985/86) p. 310.

[11] Burton, DEVIANCE, TERRORISM & WAR, p. 171.

The proposition is that certain individual and group needs must be satisfied if society is to be just and peaceable.[13] The research indicates that the more deprived people are by the lack of material resources or participation in decision-making structures, the worse they feel.[14] As well, persons who suffer deprivation in one sphere without satisfactory redress tend to generalize their dissatisfaction from one area of discontent to another, and to have general feelings of frustration.[15] Thus, it is hypothesized that if there is to be a more just and peaceable society then ultimately these needs have to be promoted and institutional structures created that embody these needs.

Groups who seek to satisfy their identity, security and participation needs through conflict are essentially seeking change in the structures of their society. Conflict arises because one group benefits at the other's expense and is denied the possibility of actualizing their basic human needs.[16]

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[12] Groom, "Practitioners And Academics: Towards A Happier Relationship", CONFLICT IN WORLD SOCIETY, p. 201.

[13] Light, p. 148.

[14] Louis Kriesberg, SOCIAL CONFLICTS (Englewood Cliffs: N.J. Prentice Hall, 1983), p. 73.

[15] Ibid., p. 22.

[16] Edward E. Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions", p. 29.

IDENTITY GROUPS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

It is hypothesized that the most useful unit of analysis in protracted social conflicts is the identity group[1] rather than the nation-state, because of primary importance to the understanding of protracted conflicts are the needs, rights, motivations and interests of the groups involved. In defining the problem each party in the dispute has to confront the fact that each group in conflict has the need to establish its identity and that this need is shared. This could be a necessary condition for conflict resolution, because it could lessen or eliminate the total zero-sum terms which are a cause of conflict and war[2]. This realization and recognition of the shared need of identity could enable the parties to the conflict to confront the fact that their definition of the problem may need to be revised and that they may have misunderstood the perception of the other side about the nature of the dispute.

In establishing the definition of "identity" related to groups, it is important to note that it is a key subjective variable for students of ethnicity. Max Weber was a proponent of the subjective aspect of ethnic groups which he referred to as those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent.[3] Ethnicity[4] is the basic group identity felt by members of the ethnic community or group or it can be understood as the primary focus of group identity. It is a composition of symbolic elements that are culturally defined including: cultural content: language, religion, beliefs, values, norms; biological content: kinship, descent, race, tribe; territorial content: nationality, region, locale, country.[5]

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[1] Azar, pp. 31-32
The identity group refers to racial, religious, ethnic, cultural and other groups. It is evident that the research on protracted social conflict has underlined the need to examine the unit of analysis and correct the deficiency in international politics literature which has focused on the nation-state and their individual actions and has deflected attention from the study of ethnic, religious and other identity group conflicts within their territorial entities.

[2] George H. Quester, "War and Peace: Necessary And Sufficient Conditions", INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, Edited by Matthews et al, p. 50.

It has been argued that the basic group identity, which is related not only to the need to be special, unique or different from others; it is basic to the individual sense of belongingness and to the level of self-esteem. Therefore, ethnicity is of central importance because it draws our attention to a need that is fundamental.

Identity tends to expand with an expanding context and is often shaped by expanding territorial boundaries, therefore, group identity tends to expand or contract to fill the political space available for its exercise.[6] Thus, it is inextricably connected with the concept of self-determination.

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[3] Walker Connor, "A Nation Is A Nation, Is A State, Is An Ethnic Group, Is A ...." ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES, 4(October, 1978), p. 387.

[4] Ibid., p. 386.
Ethnicity is derived from the Greek Word for nation.

[5] M. Elaine Burgess, "The Resurgence of Ethnicity: Myth Or Reality?" ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 3(July, 1978), p. 269.

[6] Donald L. Horowitz, "Ethnic Identity", ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE, Edited by Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 137.

SELF-DETERMINATION OF IDENTITY GROUPS "PEOPLES"

Self-determination may be defined as the "right" of a "people" to shape their own political, economic and cultural destinies.[1] It is also understood as the process by which a people determine their own sovereign status.[2]

Historically, self-determination can be traced back to the Greek city-state where self government was an exercise of community auto-determination.[3] The American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen were examples where civil and juridical equality was demanded and attained through the exercise of popular sovereignty.[4] National self-determination is an application of the theory of popular sovereignty, which means the freedom of a people to be responsible for its own fate.[5] The intuitive sense of identity inherent in the idea of any people gave the concept life; in theory it stands for popular sovereignty on a global scale.[6]

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[1] "Introduction", SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL,REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, Edited by Yonah Alexander & Robert A Friedlander (Boulder Westview Press, Inc., 1980), p. xiii.

[2] Harold S. Johnson & Baljit Singh, "Self-Determination And World Order", SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, p. 349.

[3] M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Self-Determination And The Palestinians", AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (No.4, 1971), p. 31.

[4] Robert A Friedlander, "Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry", SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, p. 309 & 324.
Popular sovereignty may be defined as the concept of sovereign authority wherein power derives from an identifiable group, people, or nation and whereby the governing entity acts in a trusteeship capacity with the consent of the governed.

[5] Connor, p. 103.

[6] Friedlander, "Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry", p. 320.

Derived from President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, self-determination was another word for popular sovereignty, where national aspirations would be respected and peoples would be dominated and governed by their own consent.[7] Moreover, in United Nation's practice after 1945, it was a right a people was supposed to exercise when a territory emerged from colonial rule. Thus, the principle of self-determination served well those who sought to dissolve empires or governments of one people imposed on another that lacked economic reciprocity between the metropolitan center and the outlying colonies.

In the wars of national liberation after World War II that yielded new countries from the former British, Dutch, French, German and Italian colonies, it was evident that the metropolitan countries were remote and in some ways exploitative; and, in the case where the governments were democratic, such as in Britain, their democracy did not embrace the people of the colonies. Moreover, the break up of larger entities did not necessarily lead to responsive governments, by and for the people, but rather to the formation of local tyrannies and leadership, under a group of local autocrats hardly constitutes progress toward genuine self-determination.[8] Thus, self-determination in practice may not necessarily lead to either satisfaction or self-government.[9]

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[7] Alfred Cobban, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION (London: Collins Press 1964), pp. 63-64.
For Wilson, J.J. Rousseau's general will was not an ideal will, but the actual will of the people, which he was convinced was essentially good. He therefore believed that on this basis, a new and better international order could be built; moreover, that self-determination and national sovereignty were the only possible basis for world peace.

The U.N. Charter refers to "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people".[10] In the determination of the "self", it is important to determine which people are embraced within the self and which are not.[11] There are two elements of "peoplehood" one objective; the other subjective. The objective element is the existence of an ethnic group linked by common history.[12] There is an intimate affective tie between the members of ethnic communities which relates to the historical and cultural foundations of ethnicity, herein lies the seeds of a powerful ethnic identity. The intimate nature of ethnic identity and the strong appeal it engenders can be attributed to culture-based solidarities of ethnicity which encompass a quasi-familial sentiment even though the ethnic community subsumes many families and clans, it is an aggregate of such families and clans.[13] A peoplehood may be cemented by shared memories of common suffering.[14] It is the solidarity felt towards an ethnic community as a whole people, partly derived from historical memories, that forms the basis of identity and is the impetus for political action.[15]

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[8] Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination", FOREIGN POLICY 89(Winter 92-93),pp. 21-24.

[9] Stanley Hoffmann, "Reaching For The Most Difficult: Human Rights As A Foreign Policy Goal", DAEDALUS 112(Fall, 1983), p. 25.
When self-determination is put into practice it is hedged by limitations and caveats.

[10] Friedlander, p. 310.

[11] Michla Pomerance, "The U.S. And Self-Determination Perspectives On The Willsonian Conception", THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 70(No.1. January 1976), p. 26.

[12] Yoram Dinstein, "Self-Determination And The Middle East Conflict", SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, p. 246.

The second element to peoplehood is the subjective basis of peoplehood. Thus, it is not enough to have an ethnic link in the sense of past genealogy and history, it is essential that a people is both entitled and required to identify itself as such. It is the subjective sense or consciousness of belonging to a group and of being different from other groups.[16] Thus, one people cannot decree that another group is not entitled to peoplehood.[17]

Self-determination becomes a right whenever a given identity group collectively is prevented or seriously hindered in freely exercising its values, beliefs and practices on the indigenous territory which they inhabit by another identity group (collectivity) by coercive means.[18] The right of self-determination, being without a doubt the right of an entire people or of an ethnic group, therefore, constitutes a collective right which concerns the whole of the group.[19]

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[13] A.D. Smith, "Ethnic Identity And World Order", MILLENIUM: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 12(No. 2 1984), p. 151.

[14] Dinstein, pp. 246-247.

[15] Smith, p. 154.

[16] Burgess, p. 269.

[17] Dinstein, p. 247.

[18] Bassiouni, p. 33.

Being exercised only collectively, self-determination is to peoples what freedom is to individuals, the very basis of their existence.[20] Individual self-determination which in essence means to rule oneself or to control one's own life is a basic given of human existence. Collective self-determination is a natural extension of this basic given.[21] An inarticulate premise of the right is the existence of conflicting value-oriented beliefs and practices of two or more collectivities (peoples) on a given territory where socio-economic structures do not permit the two to co-exist. Thus, the right of self-determination is born out of a conflict between two identity groups or collectivities. Cleavages which persist over many generations provide an enduring basis for collective identities.

Where people are socialized into conceptions of themselves as members of a particular ethnicity, race, religion or class, these identities are readily able to be mobilized into conflicts. Conflicts related to ethnic, racial and religious solidarities touch off deeper emotional levels and are more difficult to manage than class divisions.[22] Thus, identity is often established in contrast to others. Awareness and also the content of collective identity are established in interaction when each self-conscious collectivity defines non-members. If the group is relatively powerful it will seek to impose its definition upon other groups.[23]

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[19] Imre Szabo, "Historical Foundations of Human Rights And Subsequent Developments", THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS Edited by K. Vasak (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 29. The right of self-determination is a collective right that concerns the whole group.

[20] K. Vasak "Human Rights As A Legal Reality", THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, p. 5.

[21] Smith, p. 159.

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[22] Milton J. Esman, "The Management Of Communal Conflict," PUBLIC POLICY 2(Winter, 1973), p. 54.

[23] Kriesberg, p. 94.

HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The ideas of human dignity and equality are the core ideas in the contemporary concept of human rights and human beings have these equal, universal, moral rights because they are human and because they are persons.[1] Human rights are the moral possessions to which all human beings are entitled and each of them equally.[2] Moreover, a human right exists by the appeal that its rightness makes to reason.[3]

Human rights refer to positive rights which one can claim not legally but morally, which is essentially of the normative domain or the category of what ought to be and not just what is.[4] Morality may be defined as "that universe of discourse concerned with rights, obligations and the arena concerned with the good.[5] Thus, rights statements are neither truths of logic nor truths of fact, but are moral truths.[6]

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[1] Morton E. Winston PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Belmont: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1989), p. 9.

[2] Ibid., Human rights are equal and persons have the same rights irrespective of their particular character as individuals, that is their race, religion, language, nationality, gender, ethnic origin, property relations or other status.

[3] Stanley Hoffmann, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981) p. 97.
In Lockean theory, human rights are natural rights derived from the Law of Nature, a law of reason that imposes constraints on what individuals can do to one another that protects life, liberty and possession of equal and independent human beings.
"Natural law" is that which everyone becomes conscious within himself of what is right and wrong.

[4] Ibid., pp. 96-97.

The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states: "Recognition of the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world". Freedom is the overriding issue for groups who want to participate in different value processes. For people who are demanding the right to life, to liberty and justice as seen in their own case, what is fundamentally at stake is the pursuit and realization of basic values and needs.

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[5] R.J. Vincent, "Western Conceptions of A Universal Moral Order", THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 4(1978), p. 21.

[6] Winston, p. 10.

SECURITY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

A basic need is for security. Security is the relative freedom from harmful threats and in international relations the term has been used to denote the physical safety of a nation, its territorial inviolability and its national sovereignty.[1] Self-preservation is the core of all security considerations which has traditionally meant relative freedom from primary military threats.[2] Security is a basic requirement for each of the protagonists in the conflict. Subjective perceptions are also important because essentially the lack of any confidence and distrust that policy makers and populations hold about the motivations of the other side lies at the heart of the problem. The scope and nature of the violence and destruction over decades of bitter conflict deeply affect hostile attitudes that are mutually held by parties to the conflict. Parties to the conflict have the most rigid ideas about the character and motives of their opponents; their selections from past history and their moral judgments justify, confirm and reinforce their attitudes.[3] Thus, suspicion generates suspicion and inhibits cooperative initiatives. Essentially the lack of any confidence and trust in the other side's intentions lies at the heart of the problem.[4] Therefore, security considerations are as much political and psychological problems as they are military problems.[5]

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[1] John E. Mroz BEYOND SECURITY (New York: Pergamon Press 1980)., p. 105.

[2] Ibid., pp. 106-107.

[3] Herbert C. Kelman "The Palestinization of The Arab-Israeli Conflict," JERUSALEM QUARTERLY 46(Spring 1988), p. 10.

Security is also linked to the actualization of other needs. It is hypothesized that the more secure the identity of a minority ethnic group, the more likely it is to accord recognition to others and to cooperate within wider social and political systems.[6]

Another aspect integral to security concerns morality. If morality is the fruit of security, then security depends on observing a certain common standard of morality.[7] An effective morality requires a sense of community. Some sense of world community does exist. People talk and behave as if such a community exists. A community means that its members are bound by ties of solidarity. The moral feelings such as obligation derive from these bonds. Community, in the end, is what makes altruistic individual behavior or enlightened group behavior possible.[8]

Thus, moral considerations are of equal importance as other variables in evolving a framework for conflict resolution. Through development of a non-coercive framework for conflict resolution there is hope for development of enlightened group behavior and recognition that perpetuation of double standards becomes more difficult for some leaders and their populations to maintain from a moral standpoint.

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[4] Mroz, p. 136.

[5] Ibid., pp. 187-188.

[6] Burton, GLOBAL CONFLICT: THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS, p. 147.

[7] Martin Wight, POWER POLITICS, Edited by Hedley Bull & C. Holbread (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 297.

[8] Stanley Hoffman, p. xiii.

POLITICAL RECOGNITION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

If we assume that the most chronic and insoluble conflicts are those that involve political claims for recognition and accommodation of collective identities, then part of the resolution process must encompass recognition of group identities on a reciprocal basis. Reciprocal recognition requires acknowledgment of the problem and exploration of the needs of opposing parties and strategies of satisfying these for the mutual benefit of all concerned. The most essential aspect is recognition of the right of the other side to exist. Part of the process must recognize the right of a people to pursue their own political demands, to share power equally and for the correlating right of the individual to participate freely and fully in the political process.[1] Therefore, there must be attempts to minimize the perceived victimization due to the denial of a separate identity of parties in the political process.

Implied is a level or degree of inequality. Inequality refers to a hierarchy in which some persons, groups or positions are regarded as having more desirables than other persons, groups or positions.[2] For Alexis de Tocqueville there were two dimensions of the concept, "equality of condition", which refers to public liberties, including equality before the law, equality of movement in public places, and the principle of one-person - one-vote, and "equality of means" or equal opportunity.[3] Another aspect is equality of outcomes or of results which lead to demands for equality of political participation and economic equality of opportunity or distributive justice.[4] It has been asserted that social equality is a widely shared value; by virtue of our humanness we are all equally worthy of respect and the opportunity for self-realization. Dilemmas and moral disagreements arise because equality has many dimensions. One of these concerns the nature of justice and its relationship to equality. Thus, for the purposes of this discussion a just social order is based on two principles; first, that each person has an equal right to the most basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others; second, that social and economic inequalities are arranged so that they will be to everyone's advantage and attached to positions and offices open to all.[5]

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[1] Paust, p.13.

[2] Louis Kriesberg, SOCIAL INEQUALITY (Englewood Cliffs: N.J. Prentice Hall, 1979), p. 4.

A people's right to equality is related to political self-determination, whereby the group is able to participate freely and fully in the political process. Realization of the basic need of participation requires removal of restrictions on political participation and activity and establishment of freedom[6] as demanded by the group and equality of political rights.

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[3] Burgess, p. 278.

[4] Hoffmann, pp. 143 & 147.
The issues of distributive justice, while rooted in economic processes are deeply tied to the nature of political and social systems and are thus ultimately political issues. Distributive justice should be concerned with the achievement of minimal rights of all groups within the political system.

[5] Kriesberg SOCIAL INEQUALITY, pp. 10-11.
The first principle requires the equality of certain minimal conditions or rights for all persons, particularly with regard to civil rights and the second principle means that for inequalities in social and economic conditions to be just everyone should have the chance to gain by them through positions in which everyone has equal access.

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[6] Marian D. Irish & James W. Prothro THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1971), p. 42.
In the western world political participation and "freedom" are aspects of democratic government which also include majority rule and respect for minority rights. Majority rule exists so long as the public at large is free to choose the men and women who make public policies, minority rights exist so long as those in the minority may openly attempt to win majority support for different leaders and policies without a loss of the individual rights enjoyed by the majority. The degree of democracy refers to how widely shared are the rewards and deprivations of the system.

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIMENSION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT RELATING TO IDENTITY AND RECOGNITION

A central problem in the Israeli-Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict related to the Palestinian identity has been the official Israeli designation of Palestinians as "non-Jews", or the "Arabs of Eretz Israel".[1] This classification of the Palestinians in effect has meant they have been treated as second class citizens. The Palestinians are more than just a faceless group of refugees, as indicated in Resolutions 242 and 338, but are a separate Arab people with a right to self-determination.[2]

Historically, at the time of the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, which pledged British government support of Zionist effort to establish a Jewish state, the Palestinians were referred to as the "existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine".[3] As a result of the British government commitment to the Zionist movement and its colonial aspirations, more than 700,000 people of Palestine, who comprised 92 percent of the population were denied their national and territorial identity.[4]

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[1] Edward W. Said, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p.221.

[2] Ghayth Armazani, "The Right of The Palestinians The International Dimension", JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES 3(Spring 1974), p. 92.

[3] A.J. Balfour, "The Balfour Declaration" THE ARAB-ISAELI CONFLICT, Edited by J.N. Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 885.

[4] Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "Retrieving Palestinian National Rights," PALESTINIAN RIGHTS: AFFIRMATION AND DENIAL, Edited by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Willmette: Medina Press, 1982), p. 4.
The Balfour Declaration did not refer to the Palestinian population as a national community.

Thus, the Palestinian community has had to struggle to maintain its identity on two levels: first, as Palestinians with regard to the historical encounter with Zionism[5] and the loss of a homeland; second, as Palestinians in everyday life. Because Palestinians were a dispossessed people, to be a Palestinian has meant living in a non-place.[6]

Israelis and Palestinians have perceived their conflict in zero-sum terms, where each side has interpreted the acquisition of national identity and rights to be at the expense of their own identity and rights. What is involved fundamentally in such a conflict is a divergence of basic identity which manifests itself in the "we-them" syndrome.[7] Each community has perceived the other as set to destroy its identity. Since each has perceived that its identity could be secured only by being dominant, there could be no letup in a power struggle. Therefore, over the decades of conflict, there has been denial of each other's identity and right to exist as a nation and delegitimization of each other's movement, such as depiction of Zionism with racism and Palestinian nationalism as terrorism.[8]

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[5] Lisa Hajjar, M. Rabbani & Joel Beinin, "Palestine And The Arab-Israeli Conflict For Beginners", INTIFADA THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING AGAINST ISRAELI OCCUPATION, Edited by Zachary Lockman & Joel Beinin (Washington: Middle East Research & Information Project, 1989), p. 102. Zionism is the modern political movement based on the proposition that Jews all over the world constitute a single nationality and the only solution to anti-semitism is the concentration of as many Jews as possible in Palestine and establishment of a Jewish state.

[6] Said, pp. 121-122.

[7] Walker Connor ,"Nation Building Or Nation Destroying", WORLD POLITICS 24(April, 1972),p. 341.

[8] Kelman, "The Palestinization of The Arab-Israeli Conflict," pp. 9-10.

Western prejudices about Islam, the Arabs and the orient created an attitude toward Palestinians that dehumanized them, because they became known only as refugees, extremists or terrorists; whereas there has been legitimization of Zionism as against Palestinian rights.[9]

Confronted with the consistent denial of their national and territorial identity, the Palestinians have historically and politically responded with very specific territorial and cultural assertions. In 1922, the Palestinian leadership in making representation to the British government argued first, that the Palestinians territorial identity was derived from their continued habitation on the soil of Palestine; second, the Arab identity based on the language and culture of the Arab national community was dated from the transformation of Palestine in the Seventh century; moreover, within that national and cultural identification there had always been a specific territorial dimension that produced the specific Palestinian Arab identity.[10]

Palestinians have always been conscious of their specific Palestinian Arab identity. According to their definition, Palestinians are those Arabs who have lived or who now live in Palestine, or are descended from Arabs who lived in Palestine. In article 5 of the Palestine National Covenant of 1968 the Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born after that date of a Palestinian father - whether inside Palestine or outside it, is also Palestinian. The broad definition of a Palestinian identity is derived from the simultaneous awareness of two primordial Arab allegiances: one is "qawmiyya," meaning people, group or tribe, used to express political allegiance and the commitment to realization of Arab nationalism through unity; the other is "watan," meaning country or homeland and expresses patriotic attachment to a single country. Since the founding of the PLO in 1964 and especially since the Six Day War of 1967, Palestinians have emphasized the particular or homeland element of Palestinian identity over the pan-Arab one.[1] Thus, Palestinian identity has been defined in terms of the territorial claim made by virtue of a historic right that proves that the land in question was once occupied by members of their historic community, even though the Jews were rival claimants to the same territory.[2]

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[9] Said, pp. XIV-XV

[10] Abu-Lughod, pp. 4 & 5.

In Palestine there are and have been two peoples: Jews and Arabs. The Zionist movement's claim that there was a Jewish people entitled to self-determination has resulted in an Israeli people and a state of Israel. The demographic ratio between Arabs and Jews in Palestine has shifted over the years. Initially the Arabs were in overall majority, but today the majority is Jewish although it had been projected by the Israeli government that the number of Palestinians will reach two million within fifteen years in the West Bank and

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[1] S. Mishal, THE PLO UNDER ARAFAT: BETWEEN GUN AND OLIVE BRANCH (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 61.

[2] M. Steinberg, "The PLO And The Mini-Settlement", JERUSALEM QUARTERLY 21(Fall 1981),p. 130.

Gaza Strip.[3] It was thought that the demographics would shift in favor of the Palestinians but this is no longer the case since the immigration of hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews into Israel.

There is a Jewish people and an Arab people in Palestine. But each, in the past, has refused to concede one another's determination of self as sufficient or conclusive. Israelis maintained that Palestinians as individuals possessed rights which had to be recognized, but that they had no rights or status as a people or nation.[4] For a just solution to the conflict both sides have to recognize that both are entitled to self-determination. Each must be free to determine its own political future; neither can dictate to the other.[5] The real dilemma thus has been recognition of the other, because each side has viewed the other as fundamentally dangerous; because of the fear that has built up over decades of conflict and war, each side has distorted the other's intentions.[6]

For the Palestinians there were stages in its recognition as a people. From 1948 to 1969 the United Nations viewed the Palestinians merely as refugees (Resolution 194 - of 1948). With stage two in 1969 the United Nation's General Assembly recognized the Palestinian "people" as the primary party to the conflict. Stage three was in 1970 when the U.N. recognized the inalienable rights of the

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[3] Hajjar et al, p. 105.

[4] Jimmy Carter, KEEPING FAITH (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 276.

[5] Dinstein, p. 252.

[6] Kelman, "The Palestinization of The Arab-Israeli Conflict", p. 10.

Palestinian people and affirmed that no peaceful solution can be made other than on the basis of self-determination.[7]

Thus, the Palestinian people, who are conscious of existing as such must be placed in a position within the framework of a conflict resolution process in order to exercise ultimately its right to self-determination. The United Nations' Declaration on Principles of International Law of 1970 states that: "all people have the right freely to determine, without external interference their political status."[8]

Although the Palestinians have in the past seen themselves basically in terms of negative attributes,[9] this is now changing because the Palestinians will no longer tolerate the status quo. The intifada[10] has communicated the way the Palestinians respond to a continued abridgment of their right to self-determination.[11] Moreover, the Palestinian identity is in a process of evolution, which implies a striving towards its ultimate realization. The important part is that identity functions politically toward independence and freedom from oppression.[12] Therefore, it has been contended that it has been very important for the Palestinian people to work to obtain the right to assemble and debate issues that affect their lives, the right to property without fear of its being confiscated, and the right to be free of military rule, which in effect have been the objectives of the intifada. The Palestinians demand recognition of their collective existence and have claimed to be separate or distinct from other Arabs in basing themselves upon the demand for self-determination.

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[7] M. Cherif Bassiouni, Comments re: L.C. Green's "Self-Determination And Settlement of The Arab-Israeli Conflict" AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Proceedings of The American Society 65(September 1971), p. 62.

[8] Hasan Bin Tal PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION: A STUDY OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, (London: Quartet Books 1981), p. 89.

[9] Said, p. 117

[10] Saleem M.M. Qureshi, "The Palestinian Intifada And Islamic Fundamentalism", MIDDLE EAST FOCUS 3(Winter, 1989), p. 8. The Palestinian "Intifada", which means literally 'to cast off the yoke of the past', began on December 9, 1987.
Leslie Green, Regional Conference On the Intifada, University of Alberta, October, 1988. At this conference the "Intifada" was defined as a "popular insurrection" of the Palestinians against Israeli forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

[11] Mark Tessler, "The Intifada And Political Discourse in Israel" JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES 19(Winter, 1990). p.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

The special status of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) derives from the fact that for the Palestinians and for many others, it symbolizes the Palestinian struggle for recognition of their collective identity. Before the organization of the PLO, the Palestinians were scattered, incoherent and uninformed; it was only after the PLO was formed in 1964 as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people that they were seen and acted as a people.[1] The PLO had no native territory on which to operate, but over the years it gained commitment of the overwhelming majority of Palestinians exiled, occupied or inside Israel.[2]

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[12] Said, p. 130.

[1] Helena Cobban, THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION: PEOPLE, POWER & POLITICS (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 10.

[2] Said, p. 134.

According to one author the PLO was seen as a splinter group, but the election of Yasir Arafat as chairman in 1969, marked the beginning of political, military and ideological development of the organization.[3]

Instrumental to the emergence of the PLO as the focus of Palestinian identification and the center for Palestinians was its ascendence in the international arena. The recognition of the PLO in international forums such as the granting of observer status at the UN General Assembly, admittance to the nonaligned group, acceptance as a member of the "Group of 77" developing nations, full membership in the Arab League and ECOSOC (Economic Commission For West Africa); moreover, recognition by the Soviet Union increased its prestige when it succeeded in developing relations with the west. International recognition of Palestinian rights as legitimate was attributed to the PLO, which gave them special status in the occupied territories.[4]

The PLO came to possess attributes of a semi-sovereign government; with PLO leaders instrumental in constructing an extensive political infrastructure, including military and paramilitary formations, communications media, research and financial bureaus and diplomatic legations in the West Bank since 1967.[5] Because it coincided with an emerging Palestinian identity fostered in part by the occupation and because it succeeded in fashioning coherent organizational structures, the PLO was able to portray itself as the wave of the future, moreover, the primacy of the PLO was openly acknowledged by many in the traditional elite of the West Bank.[6]

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[3] B.N. Al Hout, "The Nature of The Palestine Liberation Organization", PALESTINIAN RIGHTS: AFFIRMATION & DENIAL, p. 17.

[4] Shmuel Sandler & Hiller Frisch, ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS AND THE WEST BANK (Lexington: D. Heath & Co., 1984), pp. 79, 82-83.

[5] Mark Heller, "Politics & Change In The West Bank Since 1967", PALESTINIAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS Edited by Joel S. Migdal (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980), p. 208.

It has been argued that a strong and well articulated Palestinian national identity has grown among Palestinian Arabs on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the 1970's and 80's, but the endeavor to institutionalize and express this identity has been hampered by the policies of the Israeli military government.[7] Following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty in 1979, there were strong denunciations of it by a wide range of public figures in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, who asserted that it directly harmed their legitimate rights and national aspirations and they reaffirmed their commitment to the PLO, as the symbol of Palestinian unity and expression of their will in all forums.[8]

The Islamic Challenge to the PLO: Hamas and Islamic Jihad

Although it is reasonable to assume that the vast majority of the Palestinians identify with the PLO, the Islamic Resistence Movement known as

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[6] Ibid., pp. 209-210.

[7] Ann M. Lesch, POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP (Washington: M.E. Institute, 1980), p. 101.

[8] Ibid., p. 17.

Hamas, which is a branch of the world wide Muslim Brotherhood[9] and Islamic Jihad are the two main advocates of an Islamic alternative for the Palestinian struggle.[10] The relationship between the Islamists and PLO was initially close in the mid-1980's on the tactical level with Hamas supporting the PLO; moreover, the PLO reciprocated the cooperation and a broad based strategy emerged. It is ironic that Israel once encouraged Islamic fundamentalists in order to undermine the PLO.[11]

Although Hamas and Islamic Jihad maintained independent institutions and political and social programs they neither challenged the PLO legitimacy nor claimed to be alternatives to the PLO. However, this position began to change in 1988 when Hamas opted to present itself as an alternative leadership to the PLO.[12] The younger generation is particularly vulnerable to the appeal of Hamas, which increased after its participation in protests against the violence perpetrated against Palestinians by the Israeli military and when it issued its covenant that called for jihad against the Israeli occupation.[13] To Hamas participating in the peace process is nothing but a "sellout" of Palestine and holy Jerusalem especially in a world where the United States is the uncontested hegemon and peace conferences are instruments designed to promote Israel's expansionist program and secure capitulation of Arab and Islamic worlds.[14]

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[9] S.M.M. Qureshi, "The Palestinian Intifada And Islamic Fundamentalism", p. 89.

[10] Muslih, p. 26. Hamas was established in 1987 as the political and military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.

[11] Qureshi, p. 9.

[12] Clinton Bailey, "Hamas: The Fundamentalist Challenge To The PLO", POLICY FOCUS, 19(April 1992) The Washington Institute, 1-23.

[13] Qureshi, p. 9.

The PLO adoption of resolutions at the 19th PNC in 1988, that called for the end of the conflict with Israel, on the basis of partitioning the land between two states Israel and Palestine, went against basic Hamas views. By voicing its opposition to PLO moderation, Hamas was able to institutionalize its extreme and uncompromising position on the conflict, which has meant it has opposed any peaceful solution; it considers Palestine a trust to be held by Muslims until the Day of Resurrection and it has argued that no Arab or Islamic ruler, or Palestinian organization has the right to cede any part of this Islamic land.[15] Hamas assumed that when the Palestinian people despaired of hope for partial solutions they would understand there is no path but jihad for liberating all the land and at that point Hamas believed it would inherit the mantle of Palestinian leadership.[16]

But the PLO has been acknowledged as their representative by the majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and Palestinians have not been willing to enter negotiations without PLO approval. Since a political solution to the conflict will involve the occupied territories, and because the West Bank and Gaza are inhabited by Palestinians, resolution of the conflict must include Palestinian representatives, the PLO.[17] Moreover, PLO exclusion has in the past amounted to a continuation of the status quo.[18] The PLO under Yasir Arafat's leadership continues to be the only agency accepted as legitimate by the majority of Palestinians in the territories and diaspora. A leading Palestinian has asserted that no one could replace the PLO; nor could anything be done without them, since every political step made by the Palestinian people is within the framework of the PLO.[19]

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[14] Muslih, p. 27.

[15] Qureshi, p. 9
Bailey, pp. 7-8.

[16] Bailey, p. 7.

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[17] Y. Harkabi ISRAEL'S FATEFUL HOUR (New York: Harper & Row 1988), p. 14.

[18] Kelman, "The Palestinization of The Arab-Israeli Conflict", p. 8.

[19] Interview with Faisal Husseini, "Palestinian Politics After The Gulf War", THE JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES 20(Summer 1991), p. 106.

SECURITY AS A NEED FOR ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS

Within Israel various domestic parties and factions have held significantly different and competing perspectives concerning Israeli security. Some Israelis have emphasized the quest for peace through negotiations whereas others have focused their attention on the assurance of security. Differences in emphasis may be understated or ignored through preoccupation with the ever-present security imperative. It has been argued that these differences are real and have set Israelis apart from each other and have caused a polarization over foreign policy, especially concerning the occupied territories.

On the one hand the traditional argument among establishment politicians was to insist on retention of the occupied territories as vital for security and strategic considerations based on territory, because hostile forces would be within artillery range of Israel's cities and airports. Secondly, it has been feared that the West Bank would become a base for terrorists; and finally that withdrawal from the territories would deal a blow to the nationalist ideology of a Greater Israel.[1] But on the other hand certain military experts were increasingly inclined to the opposite view, that occupation was a strategic handicap and that occupying the territories did not guarantee Israeli security[2] .

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[1] Harkabi, p. 46.

[2] Amos Oz, "Two Intellectuals Review The Issues", WORLD PRESS REVIEW 38(May 1991), p. 22.

The basis of Israel's continued presence in the occupied territories was justified on the basis of "security", which meant that national security required that continued presence in the territories was necessary; moreover, Israel reserved the right to be the sole judge of any threat to that "security".[3] Security was the reason advanced for Israel's refusal to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Thus, Israel resisted efforts to have her withdraw to armistice lines of June 1967, which Abba Eban described as the "lines of Auschwitz", for the dangers posed to Israel's survival.[4]

In the resolution process security for people and territory remains the cornerstone that must support any agreement. On the one side it is important to understand the legitimate fears and security concerns of Israel,[5] since in her struggle for survival, she has had over the decades to face military dangers since 1948 and has been at war with Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon; Egypt alone has made peace with Israel. Consequently, Israel has viewed its security problem in terms of the whole Arab world.[6]

Territory is a major component of Israeli security. It has been needed for warning time to mobilize the civilian army. Early warning stations on the ridges above the Jordan River, as well as a security fence along the border with Jordan have been important to prevent infiltration of the enemy, to keep vital city centers of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv beyond mortar range and highways safe for travel.[7]

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[3] Bin Tal, pp. 127 & 129.

[4] Gidon Gottlieb, "Israel And The Palestinians", FOREIGN AFFAIRS Reprinted in CPPME BULLETIN 12(Fall 1989), p. 7.

[5] Mroz, p. 189.

[6] Gottlieb, p. 6.

It has to be recognized that security considerations have been a primary concern for Israelis, but on the other side, it is no less the case for Palestinians, who have lived under conditions of total insecurity. The concept of self-government was denied them; and they have lived under conditions of total insecurity[8] as individuals, since as refugees, they have had no stable place, homes or country to call their own. Moreover, Palestinians in their refugee camps and in the occupied territories are not going to feel secure as long as the fighting goes on and they have little or no stake in future negotiations. The security of Israel and the rest of the world is meaningless to them unless they themselves are secure.[9]

It becomes impossible to ignore the continued deprivation of Palestinian rights which is a cause of their insecurity, and it is also contrary to the basic moral and ethical principles of Israel. The very principles of Zionism such as self-determination, sovereignty for peoples, democracy, equality and non-discrimination require of the Israelis not to fall into hypocrisy[10] and continued maintenance of double standards, but on the basis of morality and justice to recognize that these same principles can be equally invoked by the Palestinian people. Moreover, those Israelis who have learned to know Palestinians as human beings have begun to question their own ability to maintain certain moral and human values, while at the same time they ignore the needs and values of the Palestinians.[11]

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[7] Ibid., p. 7.

[8] National Lawyers Guild, THE TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, p. 121.

[9] A. Kubursi, "Economic Benefits of Palestinian Statehood," MIDDLE EAST FOCUS 9(Summer/Fall 1986), p. 29.

[10] Claire Palley, "Foreward," THE PALESTINIANS, Edited by David McDowall (London: The Minority Rights Group, 1987), p. 4.

In the end the security of Israel can be ensured by their observance of a certain standard of morality and justice which is an integral part of the resolution process.

Terrorism

A major stumbling block to security concerns has been the issue of terrorism. There has been an essential political controversy over what terrorism is and who terrorists are.[1] One bloc of nations has viewed the PLO as the center of transnational terrorist crime.[2] This argument is given further credence through evidence that indicates the most spectacular terrorist incidents were orchestrated, directed, or executed by PLO "loyalists" (Abul Abbas) or organs of Arafat's own

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[11] Saunders, p. 311.

[1] Said, "The Intifada and Independence", THE INTIFADA: THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING AGAINST ISRAEILI OCCUPATION, p. 18.
There is no generally agreed upon definition of terrorism. As Raymond Aron observed an action of violence is labelled "terrorist" when it's psychological effects are out of proportion to its purely physical result.

[2] Darrell Trent, "The New Religion: Terrorism," HUMAN RIGHTS, 8(Winter, 1980), p. 11.

Fatah organization including Western Command headquarters based in Amman and Force Seventeen based in Tunisia.[3] Thus, a chorus has been led by Israelis about the scourge of Palestinian "terrorism."[4] Other evidence given to substantiate this claim is that the PLO has continually fuelled and encouraged violence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[5]

Although violent tactics have been part of PLO strategy, the evidence also indicates that the PLO, although pragmatic under the leadership of Chairman Arafat, has had to deal with internal divisions over policies, and positions have evolved over time. For example, even though the PLO had long rejected co-existence with the Jewish state and a two-state solution to the ongoing conflict, this position was officially changed in resolutions adopted at the Algiers meeting of the Palestine National Council (PNC) in November 1988, where terrorism was officially renounced and the existence of the state of Israel was recognized.[6] However, critics were quick to point out that the PNC had yet to formally repeal its covenant that has called for "armed struggle" to replace Israel by a secular, democratic state of Palestine. A few hard-line members of the organization continue to support a phased strategy that is intended ultimately to remove the state of Israel from the map.[7]

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[3] Mark Heller, "The Palestinian Dimension of The Arab -Israeli Conflict," p. 26.

[4] Said, "The Intifada And Independence," p. 11.

[5] Yoav Biran, "Why Israel Fears A PLO State", WORLD PRESS REVIEW, 36(February 1989), p. 20.

[6] Alan Hart, ARAFAT: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), p. 545.

Although Yasir Arafat had formally renounced terror in 1985 in the "Cairo Declaration," he at the same time retained the right to attack military targets in Israel and the occupied territories, a right he has claimed was guaranteed occupied peoples by the U.N. Charter. This formula was repeated at Algiers.[8] Thus doubts were raised among the Israeli leadership of former Prime Minister Shamir and the Likud party that there had not been any essential change in Arab and PLO attitudes toward Israel. On the one hand, it seems that the PLO has maintained a two-track policy which has called for "armed struggle" against Israel but at the same time, Fatah, the mainstream group within the PLO, has asserted a political program calling for self-determination leading to an independent Palestinian state west of the Jordan River, the representation of the PLO, directly or indirectly, in any peace negotiations and the end to Israeli military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza.[9]

On the other hand, a prominent Palestinian has claimed that the resolution of the 19th PNC in Algiers in November 1988 that declared the Independence of the State of Palestine constitutes the most explicit formulation of objectives that reflect a dominant trend for over a decade in Palestinian politics, which has been towards a peaceful, comprehensive two-state solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.[10] The significance of the elimination of the term "armed struggle" from the 19th PNC Political Statement cannot be overemphasized; moreover, the full, explicit commitment to a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to acceptance of security and peace for Israel in the context of this solution is significant. There has been a long-standing commitment of the central PLO leadership from the 12th PNC in 1974 to the time of the 19th to a political program. Rather than a sudden change in the PLO, this is the result of mature deliberation as the result of seven sessions of the PNC held over a decade and a half.[11]

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[7] Gottlieb, p. 5.

[8] Marie Colvin, "The Ambiguous Yasir Arafat," NEW YORK TIMES, (December 18, 1988) (Reprinted in BULLETIN CPPME Spring 1989), p. 13.

[9] REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP, TOWARD ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE, (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1988), p. 21.

The irony is that the state of Israel is the end product of terrorism.[12] Israeli governments have condemned the defeated side's continued use of similar methods and have failed to recognize that terrorism is the weapon used by the weak who have legitimate grievances and who attempt to meet these needs by forging a new state.

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[10] Rashid Khalidi, "The Resolution Of The 19th PNC", THE JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES, 19(Winter, 1990), p. 32.

[11] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[12] Palley, p. 4.
For many years, in the 1920s the violence was Arab initiated, but by the 1940s Zionist violence was directed against Britain as mandatory. Arab violence against Jews, Jewish terrorism against Arabs and Jewish victory in the 1947-49 war led to the establishment of the state of Israel.

THE INTIFADA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION

The Arab-Israeli conflict has gone through various phases over the decades of hostility. The latest phase in the conflict is the "intifada", which means the "shaking off" or uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that started December 9, 1987. The intifada has been an unarmed Palestinian revolt against the loss of Palestinian rights and lands.[1] The uprising indicated that continued use of coercive and violent measures by the Israeli occupation would be met with resistance because of the refusal of a new generation of Palestinians to inherit powerlessness and pain.[2]

The occupation hurt more and more Palestinian people, with its deliberate humiliation of them through degrees of subjugation and oppression ranging from the closing of schools and universities, unequal pay, the banning of books and the outlawing of the Palestinian flag.[3] As well, the dynamiting of houses, torture, collective punishments and harassments all served to remind Palestinians that they were doomed to less than human status.[4]

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[1] Abu Iyad "Lowering The Sword", FOREIGN POLICY 78(Spring 1990), p. 100.

[2] Jamal R. Nassar, "The Message of The Intifada", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL 17(February, 1989), p. 18.

[3] Iyad , p. 10.

[4] Said , "The Intifada And Independence", pp. 6-8.

Prior to the uprising, evidence from various sources substantiates that in the 1970's and 80's violations by Israeli authorities of human and political rights of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip had occurred.[5] One author stated that he did not intend to be fair in his account outlining victimization of the Palestinians for, he argued, who can be fair about blatant injustice.[6]

Thus the commitment of Palestinians and Arab states to the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people came primarily from a deep sense of injustice. If we accept that human beings are equal in their dignity as persons and equal before the law, then the fact that a people, whose sole crime was to be Palestinian, is not a proper basis for assigning them disparate rights and status. The Palestinians are a people, who over an extended period of time have been losing their political and human rights.[7] The evidence substantiates that they have been victims of discrimination and a conscious attempt to wipe out their cultural identity.[8]

When the prevailing system fails to serve the interests of the people and becomes oppressive of their demands for human dignity, then change is in order and imperative. Israel's treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories had been called the "Other Apartheid" because the Palestinians had been exploited and oppressed like the Blacks in South Africa. Israel's role as "occupier" is analogous to that of a colonial power and even though Israel is democratic, its democracy has not and does not embrace the Palestinians. The Palestinians have been denied the basic freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[9] Human rights violations such as witnessed on the West Bank and Gaza during the course of the intifada are totally unacceptable and are illegal under international law. The use of live ammunition to restore civilian order, withholding of food supplies to control and collectively penalize the civilian population and beatings to maim in order to neutralize youngsters were shocking to many observers.[10] It is evident that civil and human rights of the Palestinian population had been denied, as well as their national rights and identity.[11]

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[5] The National Lawyer's Guild, pp. 119-120. Included in this list were torture, arrests, curfews, economic and psychological pressures, blowing up of houses.

[6] Desmond Stewart , THE PALESTINIANS: VICTIMS OF EXPEDIENCY (London: Quartet Books Ltd., 1982), p. viii.

[7] Said, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE, p. 179.

[8] Colin Smith ,THE PALESTINIANS (London: The Minority Rights Group, 1984), p. 14.

The uprising thus exposed Palestinian assertiveness, self-confidence and defiance of Israeli control which was manifested in several ways: through the creation of a political infrastructure, through change in social and economic behavior, and in growing links with Israeli Arabs symbolized in the March 1988 demonstration of sympathy, support and recognition of a common Palestinian identity.[12]

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[9] "The Other Apartheid", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, July 11, 1986, p. 279.

[10] David Bercuson, "Canadian Policy In Historical Perspective", MIDDLE EAST FOCUS, 11(Winter, 1989), pp. 18-20 & 30.

[11] Nassar, p. 18.

The growth of a political infrastructure at both area-wide and local levels was an important precursor to the intifada, and involved a working alliance between people from different backgrounds, geographical areas and religions. The grassroots network of organizations and popular committees encouraged cooperation and mass participation among youth organizations, community centers, labor unions and women's groups for organization of alternative school systems, aid to families of prisoners, medical and agricultural affairs, assistance in sanitation, protection of residents by civil guard and security patrols.[13] Consequently, with the intifada the activities of the popular committees became more developed.

Prior to the intifada, an important development was the struggle of the Palestinians under occupation "to stay on the land", or "sumud". This reflected the growth of self-reliance of the Palestinians into a viable community with social economic and educational institutions.[14] Moreover, the PLO and its constituent organizations had been instrumental in building an infrastructure of support and leadership in the occupied territories, recruiting and mobilizing key sectors of Palestinian society such as students, workers, women and professionals.[15]

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[12] Michael Curtis, "The Uprisings Impact On Options For Peace", Canadian Professors For Peace, BULLETIN (Spring 1989), p. 15.

[13] Ibid.
The popular committees were not a product of the Intifada for they existed in the West Bank for a decade prior to the insurrection.

[14] Emile A. Nakhleh "The West Bank And Gaza: 20 Years Later", MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 42(Spring 1988) pp. 213-214.

The rebellion was made possible by the extensive PLO infrastructure which was nurtured over the years in the West Bank and Gaza.[16] Through the PLO the Palestinian people were mobilized and politicized and were able to stand up and say they existed in the occupied territories.[17]

The intifada helped Palestinians to regain their self-confidence and helped create indigenous Palestinian institutions. It also provided a blue-print for Palestinian political and social life that is lasting - brave, relatively non-violent, inventive and intelligent. Based on non-coercive norms of behavior that contrast with Israeli practices against Palestinians in the territories, the intifada became a model for movements of democratic protest in Algeria, Jordan, Eastern Europe and parts of Asia and Africa.[18]

In summary, in the age of democratization, no one group can militarily apply force and occupy another group.[19] The uprising exposed the injustice of

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[15] P. Johnson & L. O'Brien, "The West Bank Rises Up", INTIFADA: THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING AGAINST OCCUPATION, p. 38.

[16] Muin, Rabbani, "The PLO And The Intifada: A Complex Relationship", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, (March 21, 1989), p. 20.

[17] Nadia Hijab, "The Strategies of The Powerless", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, 12 May 1989, p. 18.

[18] E. Said, "Reflections On Twenty Years Of Palestinian History", THE JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES, 20(Summer, 1991), p. 21.

[19] Baha Abu-Laban, THE EDMONTON JOURNAL, June 30, 1990, p. F2.

Israel's policies[20] and underlined that the Palestinians have a moral cause which is legitimate. Moreover, the process of administering a regime of curtailed rights erodes the values and dignity of life of the occupiers just as surely as it diminishes the rights of the occupied.[21] The intifada demonstrates that any attempt to suppress or curtail the rights and political participation of one of the main parties to the conflict, as if they did not matter, will not succeed. The human rights of the Palestinians have to be respected, which means legitimate individual and collective rights, including self-determination in a homeland within a clearly defined territory.[22]

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[20] Abu-Laban, "The Intifada One Year Later: A Palestinian View", MIDDLE EAST FOCUS, 11(Winter, 1989), p. 11.

[21] Diane F. Orentlicher, "Human Rights In Israel's Occupied Territories", MIDDLE EAST FOCUS , 10(Spring/Summer, 1988), p. 15.

[22] Abu-Laban, "The Intifada One Year Later: A Palestinian View", p. 13.

THE ISSUE OF A PALESTINIAN STATE

The intifada brought home the fact that the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza could not be maintained indefinitely against the Palestinians. The question has become under whose authority and under what conditions will the West Bank and Gaza be governed? There have been a number of divergent views put forward on this subject.

On each side there have been differing views held. In Israel there have been those who have wanted to control all the land west of the Jordan River. Because these lands are seen as part of the "Great Land of Israel" by the Likud party, they have not accepted the international position that they are occupied territories.[1] Former Prime Minister Begin had proposed "administrative autonomy" for the Palestinians whereas General Ariel Sharon had advocated establishment of a Palestinian state in Jordan, while extremist Meir Kahane thought the answer was expulsion. But these views could not provide the basis for negotiation because the Palestinians would not agree to give up the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem to permanent Israeli control.[2] Moreover, the Likud's long-held position that it would be unsafe to give up the territories has been strengthened by the intifada and the Gulf War.[3]

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[1] Deborah J. Gerner, ONE LAND, TWO PEOPLES, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 110.

[2] Saunders, p. 314.

[3] Sicherman, p. 83.

In terms of the Palestinian problem, leaders of the Labor party have shared a commitment to the central part of the United Nations' Security Council Resolution 242--the exchange of land for peace. Although generally perceived to be more moderate and willing to compromise than Likud in the years after the June 1967 War, they supported Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and current Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin who served as defense minister from 1984 to 1990 was tough in dealing with the intifada.[4] As of mid-1990, Labor officially supported an exchange of land for peace, which would mean withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for a peace treaty with the Arab States. At the same time, however, they did not accept the idea of formation of a Palestinian State. Smaller parties aligned with Labor including Mapam, Citizens' Rights Movement, and Shinui, whose name means "change", have been more flexible than Labor in considering Israeli negotiations with the PLO, Palestinian self-determination, and complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza.[5]

On the Palestinian side under Yasir Arafat and the PLO, the dream to form an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza shows evolution of Palestinian and Arab pragmatism, since previously limitation of a state formed on this territory was thought to be treason to the Arab cause, because it was thought the state should encompass the whole of Palestine.[6] Previously, the acceptance of only part of their territory would have been tantamount to a denial of the very essence of their existence and a defacement of the Palestinian identity.[7]

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[4] Gerner, p. 107.

[5] Ibid, pp. 107-110.

There has not been consensus within the Palestinian community nor leadership on the issue of a Palestinian State. Within Fatah, the PLO mainstream, from the late 1950s to 1967, its political objectives were defined in terms of a political entity with a Palestinian identity. With the decline of pan-Arabism as a driving force in the Arab world after the 1967 war, the Fatah leadership formulated its goal in more specific terms and in 1969 adopted the DFLP's concept (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) of a Palestinian, democratic state where Christians, Jews, and Muslims could enjoy the same rights and have the same duties within the framework for the Arab nation's aspirations. In 1974 Fatah adopted the formula of an Independent fighting national authority and in 1977 announced the idea of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories that could become a homeland to the people of Palestine.[8]

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) under Dr. George Habash had rejected anything less than the entire liberation of Palestine. Only after 1977, when Lebanese fighting reimposed unity on the factions of the PLO, did the PFLP and the factions come increasingly to accept the new line of the PLO, even if with reservations.[9] But Hamas has not been in favor of a two-state solution, and has wanted to destroy Israel and to create an Islamic state of Palestine.[10]

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[6] Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 56(July, 1978), p. 701.

[7] Steinberg, p. 131.

[8] Mishal, pp. 38-40.
The DFLP formed in 1969 by the left wing of the PFLP and was led by Na'if Hawatma who seceded from the PFLP after a power struggle with Dr. George Habash.

However, most Palestinians are unwilling to compromise for anything less than some form of independent Palestinian state to achieve their national aspirations.[11] Moreover, the older generation of leaders like Arafat who are in their fifties and sixties do not want to die before they see the creation of what they fought for all their lives--an independent Palestinian state.[12] In order to end their existence as a non-people, to end their dependence on charity or tolerance of other parties whether Arab, Israeli, or international, would require the formation of a sovereign, independent state which would be a point of reference, a national anchorage, a center of hope and achievement."[13]

Several factors had convinced the aging leadership that time was not on their side, one of which was the inconclusive outcome of the use of military force in many places, i.e., the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. Thus, they needed to launch a major political initiative.[14] As well, developments within the Palestinian community such as the significant drop in the political influence of the hard-line groups, like the PFLP and DFLP and the concomitant increase in the popularity of Fatah, the PLO's dominant mainstream group, reinforced the propensity toward moderation.[15] As well, the Syrian-PLO rift after 1983 and the ensuing split within Fatah diminished the role of the rejectionists within the PLO's decision-making structure.[16] Furthermore, the resolutions of the nineteenth PNC constitute the most explicit formulation of objectives to reflect the dominant trend in Palestinian politics towards a pragmatic solution to the Palestinian problem accommodating the concepts both of Israeli statehood and Palestinian sovereignty. Since the PNC is the PLO's highest decision-making body, the 1988 resolutions provide the "constitutional legitimacy" for the diplomatic moves made by the PLO since then.[17]

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[9] Rashid Kalidi, "The Resolution Of The 19th Palestine National Council", p. 32.

[10] Lisa Taraki, "The Islamic Resistance Movement", Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Occupation, p. 175.

[11] Mohammed Shadid & Rick Seltzer, "Political Attitudes of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip", MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, 42(Winter 1988) p. 34.

[12] Colvin, pp.11-12.

[13] Walid Khalidi, "Thinking The Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State", p. 701.

Another development at the regional level showed an evolution of a collective pragmatic inter-state Arab posture as expressed in the Fez Plan in 1981, the Fez Summit in 1982 and the Casablanca Summit in 1989. At the Fez Summit in 1982, the Arab heads of state collectively endorsed the concept of peaceful relations with all states in the Middle East; moreover, at the Casablanca Summit in 1989, the Arab heads of state collectively endorsed the idea of partition (a two-state solution) and also endorsed U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.[18]

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[14] Emile Sahliyeh, "Palestinian Diplomatic Moves and Security Fears", MIDDLE EAST FOCUS, 13 (Winter, 1991), p. 12.

[15] Ibid., p. 12.
The decisive shift in the PLO's balance of power in favor of Fatah was brought about by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and subsequent dispersal of PLO troops to several Arab countries.

[16] Ibid., pp. 12-13.

[17] Rashid Khalidi, "The Resolutions Of The 19th Palestine National Council", p. 32.

Since 1974 the Palestinians have demanded the establishment of a Palestinian state confederated with Jordan. In March 1991, the situation began to change and for the first time some Palestinians have advocated the idea of an interim phase before statehood. They dropped the word "autonomy" because it was associated with the restrictive interpretation of Israel's Likud government, which insisted autonomy would apply to people but not to territory.[19] The Palestinians want sovereignty not "autonomy" under Israeli hegemony.[20] But Hamas, the Islamic resistance in the occupied territories, has rejected autonomy as a paltry compromise and has accused the negotiators from Fatah of being subservient to Israel and the West by talking about less than full statehood.[21] Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza want limited autonomy that would entail arranging for Arab elections in the occupied territories, independent Palestinian municipal governments, and Palestinian administration of police forces, schools and health care centers. If autonomy is arranged, then the timetable has to be established whereby it will lead to some form of broader Palestinian self-government. But Israelis and Palestinians differ over what such self-government will mean. Although Palestinians want autonomy to lead to an independent state that could be confederated with Jordan, Israel and the United States have long been on record as opposing an independent Palestinian state.[22]

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[18] Walid Khalidi, "The Half-Empty Glass of Middle East Peace," JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES, 19(Spring, 1990), pp. 14-15.

[19] Muhammad Muslih, "The Shift in Palestinian Thinking," CURRENT HISTORY, 91 (January 1992), 26.

[20] Salim Tamari, "What the Uprising Means," INTIFADA: THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING AGAINST OCCUPATION, p. 135.

[21] Sarah Helm, "Arab Radicals are Nervous," THE INDEPENDENT WORLD PRESS REVIEW, (September 1992), p. 22.

The self-government proposal was invented by Israel and now the issue is how far Israel is prepared to define it. By definition, self-government is a concept of limits. A self-governing authority will not be a full-fledged international citizen - a state.

But the issue is not whether self-government achieves an ideal but rather is it better than the status quo? Can it give the parties what they now do not have? For the Palestinians the answer is yes, because it would mean the end of Israeli military government, democratic political institutions, and some control over resources.[23] For Israel it would mean less responsibility for the Palestinian population and a way to deal with a "national minority" without destroying Israeli democracy or moral values or threatening the Jewish majority. The intifada and the Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War reinforced the majority Israeli position against the formation of a Palestinian (or Jordanian) sovereignty any time in the near future in the territories.[24]

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[22] Heller, "The Palestinian Dimension of the Arab-Israel Conflict," p. 25.

[23] Sicherman, p. 98.

[24] Ibid., pp. 83-84.
Russian immigration has bolstered Israeli confidence and its demographic survival is assured.

STAGES OF A CONCILIATED FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The conflict resolution process may be conceptualized as a negotiating process involving five stages which include:

1. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
2. DEVELOPING A COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE
3. ARRANGING A NEGOTIATION
4. NEGOTIATION - TRYING TO REACH AGREEMENT
5. IMPLEMENTATION.[1]

Defining the Problem

The first stage toward negotiation begins when each party to the conflict recognizes that there is a problem and the main focus is on defining the problem in a new or more explicit way. Formulating the problem in terms of the basic needs of each party is a necessary precondition for negotiations. Each side's definition must acknowledge the hopes and pain of the other side. The hopes for both peoples have been the same with the search for political expression of their national identity that has centered on the same territory.[2] While Israelis and Palestinians may not agree on who has a right to the land, they may be able to recognize each other's feelings of belonging there and develop an awareness of what the other side has suffered and why it feels unjustly treated.[3] Therefore it is important at this stage in the pre-negotiation process for each side to include the other's sense of suffering and loss and their needs of identity, recognition, and security into their own definition of the problem. This is the first stage of the peace process which is important because it establishes the base for the rest of the resolution process.

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[1] Saunders, pp. 306-310.

[2] Kelman, "Overcoming The Barriers To Negotiation Of The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 15.

As part of the prenegotiation process problem-solving workshops[4] and related vehicles for direct communication between the politically influential representatives to the two parties can be instrumental in providing an unofficial setting in which the parties can jointly explore possibilities for negotiation. This allows parties to discover each other's concerns and this process of informal interaction can aid in the restoration of transactions between the parties at the local level where conflict is most persistent and disruptive. When one side understands what the other side has suffered and sees them as human there is a greater chance that prejudices and stereotypes can be broken down. Insights and ideas derived from this could lead to a redefinition of the problem; and the monolithic image that may have been formed of members of the other side can then be changed.

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[3] Saunders, pp. 306-310.
The Palestinians feel aggrieved that they were asked to cede part of their land as a site of a home for Jewish people persecuted by others; Israelis see the land as their ancient home, or first safe place after centuries of persecution. Thus, Palestinians seek some understanding that they mourn the loss of their homes and land; Israelis need acknowledgment of their suffering in the Holocaust.

[4] H.C. Kelman, "An Interactional Approach To Conflict Resolution And Its Application To Israeli-Palestinian Relations", INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 6(1979), 99-102.

It is the pre-negotiation part that is critical to the development of later stages such as arranging for a negotiation and the actual process of negotiation. Each phase is not separate or distinct because they overlap.

Developing a Commitment to Negotiate

Equally important and overlapping with the definition of the problem is the development of a commitment to negotiate. Central to this part of the process is overcoming the psychological obstacles after a long history of conflict. Essentially what is needed is a change of attitude in order to erode suspicion, hatred and prejudices that have built up over time. Most of the efforts to initiate the peace process that failed in the past were due to a lack of commitment on the part of one or more of the parties to negotiate.

Thus, the role of leadership can be instrumental at this stage. An example is the late President Sadat's declaration of a commitment to negotiate peace with Israel in Jerusalem in 1977 which was a breakthrough that has led others like President H. Mubarak to encourage other Arab leaders to follow Mr. Sadat's lead because he was "a man of vision."[5]

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[5] Chris Hedges, "Mubarak Warns Israelis," NEW YORK TIMES, October 30, 1991.

The emphasis is on the ability of leaders to adapt, but sometimes before a new direction can be taken, the political environment must be rearranged. Israel under the leadership of former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was stymied in efforts to move effectively toward peace. When political leaders become entrapped by a particular policy, the process of scuttling often involves the change of political leadership which happened with the defeat of Shamir in the Israeli elections at the end of June 1992. In contrast, the new Prime Minister, Labor leader Yitzhak Rabin, has committed himself to a comprehensive resolution and placed the highest priority on advancing the peace talks that stagnated under Shamir.[6] For the first time an Israeli prime minister admitted openly the state's Arab citizens had suffered "44 years of injustice" and promised his government would take corrective action.[7] Although Prime Minister Rabin indicated that Jerusalem was not negotiable, there would be no dismantling of settlements and no total withdrawal, the willingness to support general political autonomy rather than municipal autonomy was seen as positive by certain Palestinians, but others such as the leading Palestinian negotiator Haidar Abd al-Shafi were disappointed.[8]

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[6] "Israeli P.M. Targets Peace," THE EDMONTON SUN, July 13, 1992, p. 36.

[7] Peres Kidron, "Rabin And Baker Work Towards A Deal", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, July 24, 1992, p. 3.

[8] Daoud Kuttab, "Highest Hopes Dashed", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, July 24, 1992, p. 10.

On the Palestinian side, it is evident that Yasir Arafat has evolved his position over time in moves to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He has committed his people and himself to negotiations as formalized by the Palestinian national movement in the political platform developed at the 19th PNC meeting in November 1988, that would give Israel the recognition, legitimacy and security it seeks in exchange for a small Palestinian state on less than 25 percent of the land that was previously sought.[9] Thus, an essential barrier to negotiation is removed when political leaders commit themselves to the negotiation process.

Arranging a Negotiation

The third stage of arranging a negotiation involves a number of procedural issues or questions that will influence the outcome of the negotiations and these include:

1) How will the parties be represented, especially the Palestinians?
2) What will be the agenda of the negotiations?
3) What will be the overall structure of the negotiations - a bilateral framework, an international conference or a multitrack approach and where will it begin?
4) Why are the negotiations happening now?

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[9] Hart, p. 546.

First, on the question of representation, negotiations conducive to resolution of conflict must be conducted by political leaders who are seen as legitimate by the communities they represent.[10] Only representatives that are chosen and recognized by these groups can come to an agreement their people will accept and feel committed to maintain.

The official Israeli government position has been that Israel will not negotiate with a representative of the PLO and in the Madrid talks, representation was to be confined to "the population" under Israeli occupation.[11] Although Prime Minister Shamir prior to the Madrid talks at the end of October 1991 insisted only on negotiating with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who were not associated with the PLO, he was willing, as one analyst described, to tolerate a lot of "static" in the background.[12] In Madrid, PLO officials only met Palestinian delegates in secret, but in Moscow the PLO officials stayed at the same hotel, travelled with the delegation from the occupied territories, and the delegation openly stated they took their orders from the PLO.[13]

The PLO is the repository for Palestinian nationhood and is perceived as the only Palestinian voice that speaks with any degree of independence;

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[10] Kelman, "Overcoming The Barriers To Negotiation Of The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," p. 17.

[11] Lamis Andoni, "The United States Attacks Palestinians," MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, March 20, 1992, pp. 5-6.

[12] Martin Indyk, "Watershed In The Middle East," FOREIGN AFFAIRS 71,(1992), p. 90. Faisal Husseini, a resident of East Jerusalem, asserted his role as the leader of the delegation.

[13] Andoni, p. 6.

moreover, only the PLO can legitimize negotiations with Israel and come to an agreement that Palestinians will accept and feel committed to maintaining.[14] The Palestinian position is that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that Israel has no right to continue to refuse to negotiate with them, any more than the PLO could refuse to negotiate with certain Israelis, who in the past were part of the terrorist groups, the Irgun (Menchaem Begin) and the Stern Gang (Yitzhak Shamir).[15]

Another issue of importance in arranging a negotiation is the substantive agenda. For Palestinians, the debate about the shape of a settlement is over practical issues such as: how could they exercise their right of self-determination in present circumstances? How would political expression of their identity be worked out in a relationship with Jordan? Thus, the Palestinians had to think in pragmatic terms of how to move from military occupation to political freedom and what forms freedom would take. Prior to the talks between Jordan and the Palestinians that resulted in the Hussein-Arafat agreement of February 1985, the question of how Palestinian self-determination might be arranged was discussed with the option of confederation between the Palestinian West Bank and Jordan which was proposed as a solution within a context. This meant that Palestinian self-determination could be exercised within a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. The example shows the Palestinian focus on the shape of a settlement that could be the subject of negotiation.[16]

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[14] Kelman, "Overcoming The Barriers To Negotiation Of The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," p. 17.

[15] Gerner, p. 168.

With regard to the structure of the negotiations, the question of a bilateral framework, or an international conference have been subject to controversy. An example is when former Prime Minister Shamir put forth proposals for elections in the occupied territories in order to bypass the Soviet proposal of an international conference. Israel's fear has been of being overwhelmed in a forum that seeks to resolve a complex, multipartied and decades-old conflict in one set of meetings which would include many international powers with their own regional interests.[17] What kind of conference structure is more conducive or can facilitate the process of peace? It probably depends on the type of conference and its timing. What are the respective merits of bilateral and multilateral approaches for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict? The evidence from past attempts to arrange a negotiation indicates that the two major strategies that have been pursued for promoting an Arab-Israeli settlement, namely, bilateral direct negotiations between Israel and an Arab partner and a multilateral peace conference have not always produced tangible results.[18] If one of the parties fears being overwhelmed in an international conference such as Israel has in the past, it is a disincentive for their participation.

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[16] Saunders, p. 316.

[17] Stewart Reiser, "The Question Of An International Peace Conference For The Middle East, MIDDLE EAST focus, 13(Summer, 1991), p. 2.

[18] A. Ben Zvi & J. Kostiner, "Inter-Arab Relations: A Stimulant For Peace In The Middle East," MIDDLE EAST FOCUS, 11(Fall, 1989), p. 4.

Negotiation

The fourth stage is negotiation or trying to reach agreement. Negotiation begins in the earlier stages already outlined, but there is a time when leaders and parties shift gears and try to actually reach agreement. In the Madrid peace talks that began in October 1991, President Bush had stated that the terms to negotiate an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict would be based on security, land for peace and legitimate Palestinian rights.[19] Secretary Baker had obtained agreement of the parties for a regional peace conference, that the negotiation should proceed in phases, with talks on interim self-government preceding negotiation over permanent status of the occupied territories.

When the actual talks got under way, the Palestinians learned the difference between the ideal and what is actually feasible in the fifth round of bilateral negotiations in Washington at the end of April 1992. The proposal for municipal elections in the West Bank and Gaza fell short of Palestinian aspirations which had centered on a national legislative assembly for the Palestinians. The Palestinian negotiator, Hanan Ashrawi stated the Palestinian delegation would study the plan which would meet the Israeli goal of confining interim arrangements to "improving living conditions" of the Palestinians under occupation. Although initially she complained that the plan did not meet the Palestinian aspirations, the possibility of achieving serious progress in the talks was not ruled out.[20] Thus in the negotiating process there are significant and controversial issues that have to be dealt with in order to end the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

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[19] Sicherman, pp. 63-64.

Implementation

The last stage of the peace process is implementation which is important because the purpose of negotiation is to produce an agreement that the parties are committed to and that can be implemented. When one agreement has been implemented it may be the starting point for the next negotiation. In seeking to bring change, "fractionating" conflict issues or separating and reducing the size of issues is important because everything cannot be accomplished all at once so piecemeal agreements allow for progress in a given area, while other problems are being worked out.[21] In the current Middle East talks, the interim solution of Palestinian self-government cannot solve the Palestinian problem immediately, but it can if properly dealt with be a vital step that will contribute to a solution.[22]

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[20] Lamis Andoni, "The Peace Process: A Positive Start," MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, (May 1, 1992), p. 5.

[21] Roger Fisher, "Fractionating Conflict," INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND BEHAVIOR SCIENCE, Edited by R. Fisher (New York: Basic Books Inc. 1964), pp. 102-103 and 107.

[22] Sicherman, p. 7

It is important in the resolution process to recognize that a conflict as complex as the Israeli-Palestinian will take time to resolve. Interim solutions or transitional processes[23] become important. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin stated that the whole wisdom of an interim arrangement is to bring about a change of attitude; once the interim agreement has proved itself with the erosion of suspicion, hatred and prejudices then "new ideas" will be brought up.[24] Changes in perception and attitude often occur in small, incremental steps.[25]

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[23] Janice Stein, "Conditions Of Successful Arab-Israel Conflict Management," MIDDLE EAST FOCUS, 9(Summer/Fall 1986), p. 11.

[24] Interview with Yitzhak Rabin, MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour Transcript, Aug 13, 1992.

[25] Saunders, p. 309.

PEACE INITIATIVES

There have been various peace initiatives, three of which will be included in this discussion: the Shultz Initiative (1988), the Shamir-Rabin Peace Plan (1989) and the Baker Plan (1989-1990).

The Shultz Initiative

Prior to the February 1988 initiative, Secretary of State Shultz had avoided any peace efforts for five years, but undertook the shuffle diplomacy with the urgings of powerful sections of the American Jewish community in the hope of helping Israel to suppress the intifada.[1] The plan included:

- bilateral negotiations "for the comprehensive peace providing for security of all states in the region and for legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and 338;
- the bilateral Israeli talks with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would set a target for an agreement within six months on "arrangements for a transitional period";

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[1] Donald Neff, "Shultz Leaves A Ticking Time Bomb," MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, April 16, 1988, p. 5.

- the bilateral negotiations would be preceded by an international conference and all participants would have to renounce terrorism and support 242.

Thus the Shultz Plan attracted Jordan through an international conference, protected Israel from feeling overwhelmed in a complex, multipartied framework, it excluded the PLO, but it attracted the Palestinians and Jordanians. It did not address the minimum requirements or needs of the parties: it did not address King Hussein's Syrian problem, and Syria had no interest in a limited conference, moreover, the PLO saw nothing in it for them; finally, King Hussein announced he could not do business with the PLO or the Palestinians while the intifada raged and he cut legal and administrative ties with the West Bank in July 1988.[2]

The United States (U.S.) did not favor inviting the PLO to an international conference because its presence would cause other parties (Shamir's Israel) to stay away.[3] The exclusion of the PLO was a continuation of a policy first enunciated by former Secretary of State H. Kissinger, who had written into the United States' Israeli Annex to Sinai II a clause stating that the U.S. would not recognize nor talk to the PLO unless it accepted the minimum requirement of unambiguous recognition of Resolution 242, which was not acceptable to the Palestinians. To accept 242 was to deny the national dimension of the Palestinian question because

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[2] Sicherman, pp. 56-68.

[3] Hart, p. 533.

242 spoke only of "refugees".[4] The Palestinians also did not benefit from the Camp David accords. Although the intention of President Carter was for a comprehensive resolution of the conflict, and Camp David led to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the end result was not beneficial for the Palestinians because substantial questions were left unanswered, such as the future of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; moreover, there was no mention of the position of exiled Palestinians other than those who left the West Bank after the Six Day War in 1967.[5]

With the failure of the Shultz Initiative, the U.S. seemed resigned to accept a stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the Palestinians changed the situation by diplomacy in November 1988 when Chairman Arafat declared an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which was seen as a victory for Arafat who sought a more moderate policy to meet the conditions set by the U.S. for a dialogue.[6] Thus Shultz announced the first official U.S. contacts to deal directly with the PLO with the opening of the dialogue, but at the same time refused to accept Arafat's two-state solution to the conflict.[7] Ultimately the initiative was unsuccessful.

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[4] Said, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE, p. 236.

[5] R. Stephens, "The Future According To Camp David," ATLAS WORLD PRESS REVIEW, 25 (December, 1978), pp. 29-30.

[6] Hart, p. 545.
These conditions included: Recognition of Israel's right to exist, unconditional support of 242 and 338, and renunciation of terrorism.

The Shamir-Rabin Peace Plan

As a consequence of both the PLO's declaration and the intifada the Israeli government found that it needed a new combined military-diplomatic offensive to turn the mounting intifada-PLO tide.[8] In April 1989, Prime Minister Shamir unveiled a peace plan that focused on the elusive solution to the "Palestinian Problem" and called for residents in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip to choose their own representatives in a free election. This political step would start an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and negotiating process that could lead to a permanent settlement between the two sides.[9] The points of the plan included:

- warming of the cold Egyptian-Israeli peace to fulfill the Camp David objectives;
- state-to-state negotiations for a comprehensive settlement;
- an international effort to resolve the refugee problem in Judea, Samaria and Gaza;

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[7] Andrew Gowers and Victor Mallet, "The Long Road To Statehood," WORLD PRESS REVIEW, (February 1989), pp. 14-15.

[8] Sicherman, p. 59.

[9] Mordechi Nisan, "Shamir's Election Proposal: An Israeli Initiative For Arab Democracy In The Middle East," MIDDLE EAST FOCUS, 11(Summer, 1990), p. 2.

- free and democratic elections to elect representatives for a transitional period of self-rule.

The Israeli emphasis on electing Palestinian representatives and dealing with them as an independent group broke new ground,[10] because in all previous peace efforts the Palestinians were allocated secondary importance.[11] It was significant, that in the proposal for elections, the Palestinians would choose representatives to negotiate a transitional period of self-rule. The plan, however, did not address all the aspirations of Palestinians both inside and outside the territories who perceived the elections as insufficient political emancipation; nor was the exclusion of the PLO from the process acceptable. If the attempt by Shamir was to try to force Palestinians to forget the goal of independence offered by Arafat and to accept permanent limited autonomy, either under Israeli rule or some type of joint Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian relationship, then it could not succeed, since Chairman Arafat viewed the plan as a "non-starter," unless PLO involvement was explicitly permitted, and unless he knew that the end result of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, after the elections, would be an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.[12]

The PLO's negative response was a result of the plan's four NO's - no end to Jewish settlement in the territories, no participation in the elections by

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[10] Sicherman, p. 60.

[11] Gowers and Mallett, p. 14.

[12] D. Goldberg, "Of 'Wedges' and 'Bridges': Competing Images of Shamir's Peace Initiative", MIDDLE EAST FOCUS, 11 (Summer, 1989), p. 4.

Palestinian-Arab residents of East Jerusalem, no participation in the elections by the PLO, and no independent Palestinian state as the final outcome of negotiations. These were cited as evidence by the PLO that the Israeli plan was an attempt to satisfy the American demand for movement in the peace process, while offering nothing of substance to the Palestinians. Moreover, the Bush administration viewed the Israeli plan as an important initiative.[13]

Within Israel, criticism of the plan centered on the Likud party's right wing refusal to support the election plan because they feared it would lead ultimately to the formation of a Palestinian state in the territories, so it sought to have then Prime Minister Shamir scuttle the proposal entirely or to tighten conditions to assume permanent Israeli control of the occupied territories. The crisis was averted and Shamir acknowledged the dictates of the Likud Central Committee but declared government policy on the election plan must be guided by the decision of the national unity coalition.[14]

Secretary of State Baker concluded that the key to movement was the "selection" before the "election"; in other words, who would be the Palestinians from the territories with whom Israel could reach agreement on election procedures and how would they be chosen? Palestinian and Egyptian support depended on an "outsider" and an Arab from East Jerusalem being included as part of the delegation.

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[13] Goldberg, "The Intifada: An Update," MIDDLE EAST FOCUS, p. 5.

[14] Ibid., p. 5.

Mubarak's Ten Points

Mubarak formulated ten points which were reflective substantially of the priority of American diplomacy of holding of elections and seven of the ten points relate to this and included:

- participation of East Jerusalemites;
- freedom to campaign;
- international supervision;
- acceptance by Israel of the results;
- elections will lead to an interim phase but also a final settlement;
- Israeli army withdrawal from polling stations;
- no entry to non-resident Israelis on polling day;
- a two-month preparatory period;
- Egypt seeks prior U.S. and Israeli guarantees of all above points;
- the halt of settlements.[15]

The important point is the request that Israel's commitment to the elections lead not only to an interim phase but also to a final settlement and all efforts be based on the principles of solution according to the U.S. conception, i.e., Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, land for peace, guarantee of security of all states in the region and Palestinian rights. Absent is any mention of the PLO, the Palestinian State, an international conference and the right of return. The focus of the deliberations seemed to shift from Shamir's Plan and Mubarak's ten points to Mubarak hosting in Cairo the opening dialogue between the Palestinian and Israelis proposed in the Shamir Plan.[16]

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[15] MUBARAK'S TEN POINTS - "basics" in MIDDLE EAST FOCUS, 11(Winter, 1989), p. 30.

The Baker Plan (1989-1990)

Supporting the idea of a dialogue in Cairo, Secretary Baker advanced a five-point framework on Elections in the occupied territories which included:

- an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue in Cairo;
- Egyptian consultation with the Palestinians on all aspects of the dialogue;
- Israeli attendance after a list of Palestinians had been worked out and in consultation with Egypt and the United States;
- Israeli attendance on the basis of their May 14 initiative and Palestinian attendance to discuss elections, negotiations and to raise issues of how to make elections and negotiations succeed;
- the foreign ministers of Israel, Egypt and the U.S. would meet in Washington to facilitate the process.[17]

In the five points Baker tried to give room to maneuver to all the protagonists. Israel and Egypt accepted the Baker proposal and the path seemed open for compromise on the sticking points over the Palestinian list. The U.S. proposed that the parties accept Palestinians who were prepared to support the two-phase (transitional/final status) process suggested by Israel and who subscribed to U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and anti-terrorism. They still hoped to satisfy Palestinian requirements by selecting a "deportee" - a Palestinian expelled from the territories for anti-Israel activities, but who even under Israeli law had a residual right to return.[18] When the U.S. resumed the push for negotiations in early 1990, diplomacy came to a close when Shamir, weakened by opposition in his own party and under severe public pressure from both the U.S. and his Labour Party partner, lost the Unity Government in March 1990, rather than accept the American proposals.[19]

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[16] Walid Khalidi, "The Half-Empty Glass of Middle East Peace," pp. 26-27.

[17] THE BAKER PLAN - "BASICS" in MIDDLE EAST FOCUS 11(Winter, 1989), p. 30.

The three peace initiatives that sought to establish negotiations did not get off the ground. It is important to analyze why there was failure. If a conflict is to be resolved satisfactorily, it has to be converted in the minds of the protagonists into a problem they share and over which they must cooperate if it is to be solved. If one of the key parties is excluded from the process then there is no chance of resolving the conflict on this basis. The PLO was effectively excluded from all three of these processes. This was one of the reasons for failure. Only the PLO can legitimize negotiations with Israel and come to an agreement that Palestinians will accept and feel committed to maintain.

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[18] Sicherman, p. 62.

[19] Ibid., pp. 61-63.

Efforts to bring about a negotiation between the parties requires a sustained commitment on each side. In the Shultz initiative, none of the parties demonstrated commitment, but then the substance for movement was not there either, because the minimum requirements of the parties were not addressed. In the case of the Shamir plan, it is doubtful in the end if Prime Minister Shamir was committed to the peace process, since he brought down the Unity Government so he would not have to accept the American proposals.

It is also evident from the failure of these initiatives that the solution to the conflict cannot be imposed from the outside. The United States has catalyzed efforts to promote the peace process, but the parties themselves ultimately have to arrive at their own solutions to which they will be committed in the end. The Shamir initiative was an attempt in this direction.

How negotiations are structured is also a factor in failure or success of a negotiation. In the Baker plan, the promotion of a bilateral framework where Israelis and Palestinians could air their views on how elections and negotiations could succeed was important. Dialogue as part of a negotiated framework can change the interaction process between the parties to facilitate discussion of areas of difference and to define the problems in ways that could lead to a mutually beneficial solution. Since a primary obstacle to conflict resolution is the difficulty of or lack of communication between the protagonists, the promotion of a dialogue can be a great step forward in transforming the relationships of the parties from adversaries to collaborators.

All these plans endeavor to reach a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although the Shultz initiative called for a comprehensive peace, it really meant settlement because the minimum requirements of the parties were not addressed. The Shamir plan was a significant departure from previous peace plans since the concept of elections gave a degree of recognition to Palestinian political aspirations but not enough in the end for Chairman Arafat who wanted the assurance that after elections there would be an independent Palestinian state next to Israel. This he did not get. In the Baker initiative, although the PLO had serious misgivings about the direction the peace process was taking, it was not opposed to elections in the occupied territories, nor a dialogue with the Israeli government. But it could not agree to a dialogue restricted to discussing the elections alone or on the basis of the Shamir Plan. Finally, it could not concede to Israel or anyone else to name the Palestinian delegation.[20] So the initiative in the end was unsuccessful.

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[20] Walid Khalidi, "The Half-Empty Glass of Middle East Peace," pp. 28-29.

THE MADRID PEACE PROCESS (1991-1992)

The Madrid peace talks that started at the end of October 1991 were the result of an energetic diplomatic effort by the United States that aimed at settling the long-standing conflict between the majority of Arab states and Israel. The Gulf War was the catalyst, having created the great strategic opening for Arab-Israeli peace. It neutralized a principal enemy of Israel, Iraq; moreover, the radical powers including Syria, Iraq, Iran and Libya found themselves without a superpower patron; and the back of the "rejectionist" front was broken. As a direct consequence, by the end of 1991, all of Israel's Arab neighbors were engaged in direct peace negotiations with Israel.[1]

It was clear from President Bush's March 6, 1991 speech that progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict was at the top of the President's agenda.[2] He stated that "the time had come to end the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of security, territory for peace and legitimate Palestinian rights".

The agreed terms of reference for the peace process included:

- that the Palestinians be represented by a non-PLO delegation from the occupied territories;
- that U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 be the basis of negotiations;

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[1] Andoni, "The U.S. Attacks Palestinians", p. 6.

[2] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

- at the bilateral talks Israel and the Palestinians should negotiate interim self-government.[3]

In the aftermath of the Gulf War all regional parties badly needed a change toward peace. On the Palestinian side, there had been the strongest incentive to bring the conference to a successful conclusion because survival as a political community was at stake. In the support of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, Chairman Arafat had in one stroke alienated both the U.S. and his principal Arab backers throughout the Gulf, had forfeited financial assistance, and undermined the intifada.[4] Thus, in the current peace talks, Palestinians have made painful compromises on key issues of participation, endorsement of "provisional" arrangements, a regional conference and establishment of a Palestinian State. The new Palestinian agenda reflected concessions made on procedure in the hope of a better deal when agreements would be made on interim self-government arrangements and the final status of the territories.[5]

Israel's need for a peace process had increased because they saw with the Gulf War a possibility of a new Arab-Israeli war; moreover, with the influx of Soviet Jews from 1990 to 1991, Israel had a need to expand its economy and increase exports to create new jobs for immigrants. The Israeli government sought loan guarantees that would enable her to borrow large amounts of capital in the international markets for its exports. The Israeli leadership had understood that receptivity of the U.S. and Europe to these requirements depended on Israel's responsiveness to the peace process.[6]

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[3] W.G. Hyland, "The Case For Pragmatism", FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 71 (1992), p. 85.
Muslih, p. 25.
Israel also did not want the Palestinian delegation to have direct connection with East Jerusalem or have formal links with the PLO.

[4] Indyk, p. 82.

[5] Muslih, pp. 27-28.

As well, Syria had more of an incentive to cooperate in promoting the Arab-Israeli peace process. In the past, Syrian President Hafez Assad had objected to a peace conference with Israel on the grounds that with its military superiority in the area Israel would have little incentive to make concessions to the Arab states. Therefore, a peace conference would only yield Arab capitulation to Israeli demands and Assad believed that the only way the Arab states could obtain meaningful concessions from the Israelis was through strategic parity with the Jewish state. As long as the Soviet Union was willing and able to supply the Syrians with sophisticated military hardware, Assad could wait for the day Israel would be sufficiently intimidated by his military prowess to make the kind of concessions he wanted.[7]

But with the collapse of the Soviet empire and the economic problems that made the former communist superpower a virtual hostage to western political will, Syrian President Assad was quick to weigh his options and to understand Syria's need for alternative patronage.[8]

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[6] Indyk, p. 82.

[7] Dawisha, p. 5.

[8] Indyk, p. 77.

As well, the Gulf War had helped to improve American-Syrian relations since Syria had sided with the allies and Egyptian President Mubarak and Saudi King Fahd had worked hard to bring Assad to accept the American-sponsored peace process with Israel and the benefits were immediate with two billion dollars from Saudi Arabia, a summit meeting with President Bush and several visits by Secretary of State Baker to Damascus. Furthermore, Assad knew he would not get the Golan Heights by remaining a rejectionist and his commitment to engage in the peace process was a quantum leap in the right direction.[9]

With regard to the issue of representation, from the outset of the Madrid talks the official Israeli position was not to negotiate with a representative of the PLO, which meant that PLO officials had to meet the Palestinian delegates in secret. Consequently, the PLO was officially left on the sidelines at the beginning of the talks in October, but by the time of the multilaterals in Moscow in January 1992, the Palestinians had chosen their own delegation, rather than the one dictated by Israel.[10] The PLO was not accorded recognition as an equal negotiating partner in the talks, even though the delegation took their orders from the PLO.[11]

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[9] Yosef Yaakov, "Why Assad Agreed", Excerpt from the Jerusalem Post, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, September 1991, P. 9.

[10] Daoud Kuttab, "Palestinian Representation", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, February 7, 1992, p. 5.

[11] Andoni, "The United States Attacks Palestinians", p. 6.

The head of the PLO's political department Faruq Quddumi argued against participation because the issue of representation would weaken the credibility of the Palestinian delegation and the PLO.[12] The inability of the Palestinians to win recognition as a separate delegation has led to a sense of despair and an increasingly frustrated constituency, thus the PLO challenge has been to find a strategy that would keep it engaged in the process without undermining popular support for the organization.[13]

After the fourth round of talks that concluded at the end of March 1992, it was evident that Israel would not give up the occupied territories, nor address Palestinian national rights. Former Prime Minister Shamir would not offer substantive concessions and maintained his own interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242 which meant no territorial compromise. Moreover, Jordanians and Israelis would not find common ground on which to build, since for the Jordanians forward movement meant negotiations on territorial compromise, acceptance of resolution 242 and a halt to settlements.[14]

Another area concerns whether or not the peace talks have brought the Palestinians closer to realization of the goal of self-determination and national independence. Palestinians in the fourth round of talks declared Palestinian sovereignty as their goal since they forcefully brought up Palestinian statehood at the negotiating table. The delegation stressed Palestinian national rights and demanded the right to self-determination and offered a detailed plan for the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which outlined steps toward Palestinian sovereignty. The interim plan challenged the United States and Israeli refusal to accept Palestinian self-determination and addressed Palestinian statehood. The plan asserted that the source of authority during the interim period would be an elected general Palestinian assembly and not Israel as indicated in the Israeli plan. Moreover, the plan advocated that the Palestinians should be able to exercise their legitimate rights during the interim period.[15]

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[12] Kuttab, p. 5.

[13] Lamis Andoni, "The Washington Talks: Deadlock Or The End?" MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL March 6, 1992, p. 3.

[14] Ibid.

There is a wide disparity between the Israeli plan for self-rule during the interim period, which seeks to maintain Israeli occupation and closes the door to Palestinian sovereignty and the Palestinian, which paves the way for an independent Palestinian structure. The Israeli proposals do not refer to "authority" as cited in the Palestinian plan, but to limited administrative arrangements that will involve Arab civil servants and there is no mention of any withdrawal or redeployment of Israeli forces or elections of Palestinians. The Israeli plan implies that Israeli authorities will appoint the Palestinian administrative staff. In contrast, the Palestinian plan called for a phased Israeli withdrawal accompanied by a transfer of administrative and judicial power to the Palestinians.[16]

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[15] Andoni, The United States Attacks Palestinians, p. 6.

[16] Lamis Andoni, "Conflicting Proposals For Interim Self-Government", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, March 6, 1992, p. 4.

Under the Israeli plan the interim self-government would remain under the overall authority of the military occupation government, which would retain a wide range of "residual powers", but it would also be subordinate to a supreme "liaison committee" that would have the right to change primary laws or terms affecting Palestinian authority and would have a direct role in every aspect of Palestinian life in the occupied territories. In the end the Israeli plan offers so little territorial and functional integrity to the Palestinians.[17] The chief Palestinian negotiator, Dr. Haidar Abd al-Shafi was incredulous at the Israeli plan. It would seem that with the current peace talks the Palestinians are no closer to realization of their national aspirations.

The bilateral Arab-Israeli talks were deadlocked less than six months after they started and nothing has been achieved as far as the Palestinians are concerned. From the Arab point of view Israel has not been put under real pressure to make concessions by either the international community or the sponsors of the talks. The PLO leadership has had to come to terms with the broadening opposition to the peace process inside and outside the occupied territories as the fragile internal unity that had existed since the beginning of the intifada showed signs of falling apart, with a major divergence between Hamas and the nationalist groups in the PLO-backed Unified National Leadership. The victory of the Islamic bloc in the elections to the Ramallah Chamber of Commerce in early March 1992 sent a chill down nationalist spins, since it had always been a nationalist stronghold.[18] Thus, Chairman Arafat has been under increasing pressure from not only the fundamentalists and leftist factions, but some leading PLO and Fatah officials, although the Palestinian "national camp" still wants to continue the talks.[19]

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[17] Yezid Sayigh, "Israel And The Palestinians: Reinstating Occupation, Legalising Annexation", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, December 18, 1992, pp. 16-17.

The lack of any significant progress in the Madrid process may be attributable to the original frame of reference which excluded the PLO from the process. Since the PLO remains in control it is senseless to keep it out of the peace process. Therefore the original Madrid formula would have to be amended since it was clearly evident after six months that there would be no progress unless Israel agreed to change the framework and agenda of negotiations. The Palestinian insistence on raising the issues of settlements and human rights were not considered to be in the terms of reference to the peace process.[20] With regard to commitment, it is doubtful whether there was real commitment by former Prime Minister Shamir to the process. Although initially, after his election in June 1992, current Prime Minister Rabin had committed himself to a comprehensive resolution, the indications are that this may have been more rhetoric than substance. Chairman Arafat continues to be committed but will have increasing difficulty maintaining his support if he cannot show tangible signs of movement to disaffected Palestinians.

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[18] Daoud Kuttab, "Factional Infighting" MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL March 6, 1992, p. 6.

[19] Kuttab, "Arafat Meets The Team", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL June 26, 1992, p. 10.

[20] Andoni, The Washington Talks: Deadlock Or The End? p. 3

Therefore, the peace talks that held out high hopes for a negotiated solution have failed to achieve significant results so leadership is critical to keep the process going.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A CONCILIATED FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

A conciliated framework for conflict resolution includes recognition of certain basic principles for peace derived from the discussion. The first is recognition that the area defined as the former mandate of Palestine west of the Jordan River is home to both peoples, Israelis and Palestinians, so the negotiation must focus on development of a formula for sharing the land between the two peoples.[1] The terms for sharing the land should be based on "pragmatic justice" that accounts for both equity and reality which embraces the changes that have occurred over time and the historical context in which the changes have evolved. Moreover, the terms that are negotiated must address the basic needs of the parties - especially their sense of injustice and their need for national identity and security.

For the Palestinians, under Yasir Arafat and the PLO, the dream has been for formation of some form of independent Palestinian state as declared in the Declaration of Independence in November 1988.[2] Within the state the Palestinians would enjoy their collective national and cultural identity, in complete equality of rights, where their political and religious convictions and human dignity would be safeguarded by means of a parliamentary democratic system of governance.

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[1] Herbert Kelman "Creating Conditions For Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations", THE JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26(March, 1982), p. 45.

[2] Edward Said "Declaration of Independence", Translation in AL-FAJR (November 28, 1988) Reprinted in HARPERS (March 1989) pp. 60-61.

In the Declaration, the Palestine National Council was prepared to trade recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination for PLO recognition of Israel as required by U.N. Resolution 242 as part of a quid pro quo.[3] It is clear that the Palestinian leadership has been willing since then to negotiate a solution which accepts a sovereign state of Israel side by side with a Palestinian state. Although the Palestinians want sovereignty they have compromised in the Madrid talks and have accepted the concept of "marhaliyyah", or stages in achieving a Palestinian state.[4] The Palestinians seem to have accepted that independence will come in stages with interim steps and agreements.

The Palestinians offered a detailed plan for the Palestinian Interim Self Government Authority in the fourth round of the peace talks, which provides steps towards Palestinian sovereignty. The Palestinians wanted the source of authority during the interim period to be an elected general Palestinian assembly and not Israel as the Israeli plan asserted. Moreover, the Palestinians wanted to exercise their legitimate rights during the interim period.[5] The main point is that a settlement that ultimately withholds sovereignty from the Palestinian people will not hold and will be repudiated.

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[3] Hart, p. 537.

[4] Muslih, pp. 27-28.

[5] Andoni, "The U.S. Attacks Palestinians", p. 6.

A second principle in order to achieve a lasting peace is that both Israelis and Palestinians must be directly involved in negotiations.[6] Even though negotiations are part of a larger multiparty framework, it is essential that Israelis and Palestinians communicate with each other directly in order to develop an understanding and an agreement that is responsive to their needs and that leads to an outcome that they will be committed to maintain.[7]

A third principle is that each party should be accorded recognition as an equal negotiating partner so that they may benefit from the highest national and international recognition that they have achieved. But the PLO was effectively left on the sidelines at the start of the Madrid peace talks and the inability of the Palestinians to win recognition as a separate delegation as the talks progressed, fostered an atmosphere of despair. Thus, an important principle is that there must be mutual recognition, and not exclusion between Israelis and Palestinians, if there is to be genuine movement towards peace.

A fourth principle is that no imposed solutions by third parties will lead to a lasting resolution of the conflict. The United States under former President Bush's administration had acknowledged that it would not impose a settlement but would be a catalyst and help to create the atmosphere if negotiation could take place.[8] Washington had in the post Gulf War period, gradually weakened its close identification with Israel, conciliated the Arabs with a more evenhanded policy and endeavored to entice the Palestinians into some sort of settlement.[9] The United States has been important as a facilitator in reducing the risks and enlarging the rewards for the parties to reach agreement. But the U.S. as a third party would not impose an agreement on Israelis and Palestinians because it is important that each party work to arrive at their own solutions to which they will then be committed. Therefore, the details of an Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal should not be dictated by the United States or any outside party.

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[6] TOWARD ARAB ISRAELI PEACE: REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP, p. 5.

[7] Kelman "Overcoming The Barriers To Negotiation of The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 17.

[8] Reiser, p. 2.

Another principle is that Israelis and Palestinians will have to work closely with Jordan, a majority of whose citizens are Palestinian, in negotiating a durable peace[10] and in arriving at a solution to the occupation of the West Bank. King Hussein formally renounced his claim to the territory in 1988 but he is as interested as the Palestinians in resolving the issues.

A further principle is that informal talks as part of a prenegotiation format, which could involve problem solving workshops[11] and other related vehicles for direct communication between politically influential representatives of the two parties, can be an important contribution to the resolution process. The evidence suggests that prenegotiation experience that involved study and discussion with opposing representatives facilitated resolution.[12] As negotiations are also taking place, the informal interaction of policy-influencing communities on both sides can promote establishment of relationships so prejudices and stereotypes can be broken down. Related to this would be the promotion of confidence-building measures such as exchanges and joint ventures that would be encouraged. Networks based on professional and other interests could cut across national boundaries and contribute to stability and integration.

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[9] Hyland, p. 51.

[10] REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP, p. 5.

[11] H.C. Kelman, "An International Approach To Conflict Resolution And Its Application To Israeli-Palestinian Relations", pp. 99-122.

Leonard W. Doob, "The Impact of The Fermeda Workshop On The Conflict In The Horn of Africa", INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GROUP TENSIONS 1(January-March 1971), pp. 91-101.

Leonard W. Doob, William J. Foltz & Robert B. Stevens, "The Fermeda Workshop: A Different Approach To Border Conflicts In Eastern Africa THE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 73(Nov 1969), pp. 249-266.

Another principle relates to the importance of an economic development plan. If we assume that poverty and impoverishment breed conflict then something akin to an Arab Marshall Plan may be needed to deal structurally with economic problems and aid the Palestinians to enhance the chances of economic viability of an interim Palestinian regime. It could be organized with a peace settlement in order to ensure adequate material support for a reconstruction and development program to the occupied territories and to improve the well-being of the poor.

A final principle is that the peace process is at best a negotiating process embedded in a political process. This relates to the role of leadership in the political process with the emphasis on the ability to leaders to adapt and avoid short-term and self-defeating policies of "no-change".

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[12] Daniel Druckman, "Prenegotiation Experience And Dyadic Conflict Resolution In A Bargaining Situation", JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 4(October, 1968), p. 367.

In Israel, under the leadership of former Prime Minister Shamir, efforts to move effectively toward peace were stymied. With the change of leadership to Yitzhak Rabin it seemed at first there would be a greater chance of a settlement because a specific commitment was made to bring the autonomy talks to a successful conclusion "within nine months". Although Prime Minister Rabin signalled a new openness to Palestinian aspirations it seems that it was more rhetoric and not substance. Critics have emphasized that his past record of being the "bone-breaking" defence minister, who encouraged the army to smash the intifada by naked violence indicates that his empathy for the Palestinians is no greater now than it was in the past.[13] Therefore, doubts have been raised as to whether he is really committed to resolution of the conflict.

The atmosphere to peacemaking would be significantly improved if there was an end to all violence, revoking of the policy of deportation and collective punishment. Violence polarizes the conflict and every act of Israeli brutality in the occupied territories lends credence to the more radical militant groups like Hamas, who argue that peace with Israel is impossible.

On the issue of settlements Prime Minister Rabin seems to have reneged on his original undertaking to freeze settlement activities in the occupied territories. He, however, has drawn a distinction between "political" and "security" settlements and promised to freeze the former variety; but made no promise with regard to the latter, which included areas of the Jordan valley, the Golan and "Greater Jerusalem".[14] It would seem from the evidence that leadership under Prime Minister Rabin has not changed significantly from that of former Prime Minister Shamir.

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[13] EDITORIAL, "What Are Rabin's Intentions", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, July 10, 1992, p. 2.

One Israeli leader underlined the pressing need for Israel to find the courage to change, which would entail relinquishing the territories, setting the necessary security arrangements and negotiating on that basis. Although apprehensive about the idea of a Palestinian State, the leader argued that ruling over 1.7 million Palestinians was even more dangerous, "both we and the Arabs will have to get used to living together in a United Jerusalem, capital of Israel." It was concluded that if Israel did not find the courage to change then she would lose out on her historic opportunities and at the same time, not move one step closer to peace.[15]

Therefore, time is of the essence, which means that the peace process must be kept moving. Leadership at this point is critical because the forces that oppose it gain great strength and a breakdown in the peace process will lead to further radicalization of Palestinian politics in the occupied territories.

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[14] Kidron, "Rabin And Baker Work Towards A Deal", p. 3.

[15] Teddy Kollek, "Israel Must Find The Courage To Change", THE EDMONTON JOURNAL March 29, 1992, p, A7.

CONCLUSION

A genuine peace for Israelis and Palestinians means an outcome from negotiations that meets the basic felt needs of both parties and leaves them better off and more secure than they are today and meets their minimal requirements for justice. A resolution to the conflict would require solutions that allow each party at least minimal satisfaction of its basic needs and national aspirations, rather than solutions experienced as defeat and subjugation.

The advocacy of a conciliated framework that is non-imposed based on human needs can be of central importance to conflict resolution. A conciliated framework that is non-imposed which emphasizes human needs, underlying causes, win-win solutions, stages in the negotiation process, interim arrangements and non-adversarial relationships offers a framework for peaceful change.

"Settlement" processes as evidenced in the peace plans that were outlined can be holding strategies and can lessen the likelihood that there could be a satisfactory solution for the parties in a protracted conflict. They have led to temporary solutions, or no solutions at all and have, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict failed to address the human needs of the parties to the conflict. On the other hand, a framework that is based on conciliation underlines the importance of exploration of the needs of the opposing party in order to understand their importance in arriving at solutions to conflict.

A conciliated framework for conflict resolution as part of a decision process must aid leaders in the selection of alternative futures whereby violence can be replaced by means that are less costly and conducive to discovery of additional options and satisfactions in peaceful relations. Conflict resolution processes are effective to the extent that parties to the dispute are helped to cost the consequences of change and no change. What is needed is a language and conceptual framework that is non-adversarial - instead of revolt, insurrection, revolution and dissent, we need problem-solving, conciliation, cooperation and reconciliation. The goal of establishing good functional relationships is sought in an effort to put aside the past relationships in order to transform the overall relationship between Israelis and Palestinians.

The two peoples must find through negotiated solutions ways of coexisting harmoniously. Therefore, a multitrack approach is important combined with opportunities for informal interaction. Confidence building measures must be encouraged so that Israelis and Palestinians will learn to trust one another. But, at the same time, many at first will not be in favor of peaceful relations so some very stringent guarantees to protect the security of Palestinians and Israelis will have to be worked out.

The current peace talks that held out high hopes for a negotiated solution at the beginning have achieved limited results. There is still reason to hope, but time is running out and the forces in opposition to the peace process grow in strength every day. Thus, the continued importance of leadership at this point is critical to keep the process going.

Both Jewish and Palestinian peoples perceive themselves as nations, which means they have a variety of cultural and ethnic elements held in common, such as selective memories, language and historical experiences that are part of a national identity. Because the search for both peoples for political expression of their national identity has centered on the same territory, a denial of the share of land to either people would be experienced by them as total defeat and such an outcome would not be the basis of a stable peace. Therefore, a settlement that denies sovereignty to the Palestinian people will not hold and will be repudiated.

Resolution if not now, but in the future for the Palestinians would entail real achievement of Palestinian self-determination, which means a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state under Palestinian leadership, democratically selected without interference by Israel. Whether there is direct or indirect participation of the PLO is something for the Palestinian people to decide by free and fair elections.

We are living in an era in which freedom is increasingly indivisible, where to deprive the Palestinians of their collective identity and human rights can no longer be tolerated and is increasingly indefensible because it obstructs movement toward genuine peace in the Middle East. At a certain point it must be recognized by creative leaders that you must accommodate the enemy for there is no other way.

Palestinians claim to be heirs to a proud history and a rich heritage that will assure them of a better future. And hopefully they will achieve what the Palestinians' best known poet has stated:

> "Our land, my friend, is not infertile.
>
> Each land gives birth in due time.
>
> And each dawn has its own **DATE WITH**
>
> **FREEDOM.**"

Khalil Barhoum, "What Price Madrid For The Palestinians", *MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL**, 17 April, 1992.*

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